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Abstract
How does saving behavior of immigrants respond to changes in purchasing power parity between
the source and host countries? We examine this question by building a theoretical model of
joint return-migration and saving decisions of temporary migrants and then test its implications
by using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel on immigrants from 92 source countries.
As implied by our theoretical model, we nd that the saving rate increases in the nominal
exchange rate but decreases in the source-country price level and that the absolute magnitude
of both relationships increases as the time to retirement becomes shorter. At the median
level of years to retirement, the absolute values of the elasticity of savings with respect to the
nominal exchange rate and with respect to the source-country price level are both close to unity.
Moreover, as we gradually restrict the sample to individuals with stronger return intentions,
the estimated magnitudes become larger and their statistical signicance higher.
Key Words : MigrantsSavings, Return Migration, Exchange Rates, Prices, PPP
JEL Classication : F22, J61
1 Introduction
How much to save while working abroad is an important decision facing a temporary migrant.
Savings repatriated to the home country are key to an immigrant households long-term welfare
improvement: they have a direct impact on the households capacity to accumulate human
capital, undertake entrepreneurship, acquire land and upgrade the e¢ ciency of its agricultural
activities, improve the quality of its housing and the stock of durables, as well as to support
consumption over an extended period of time after return.1 At the macro level, the World
Bank (2014) estimates that diaspora savings in 2012 amounted to a total of $511 billion for
the developing countries or 2.3 percent of their GDP. In the case of low-income countries, the
share of migrantssavings in GDP in 2012 is around 9.3 percent and it is even higher for Fragile
and Conict A¤ected States. The estimated diaspora savings in developing countries tend to
be in the range of .3 to .7 times as large as domestic savings (Ratha and Mohapatra, 2011).
Thus savings repatriated by migrants and channeled through nancial institutions in their
local communities can serve as an important source of funding for other, liquidity-constrained
households and enterprizes, lowering a major obstacle to growth and development.
Given the signicant role of repatriated savings in contributing to an improvement of
household welfare at the micro level and development prospects of the source country at the
macro level, it is important to understand the various factors that shape the saving decisions of
temporary migrants. In this study we examine theoretically and empirically how unanticipated
shocks to purchasing power parity (PPP) relationship between the host and the source country
a¤ect migrants saving behavior. PPP is a key element inuencing decisions of individuals
whose consumption spans two very di¤erent economies over a planning horizon. It is also a
variable that often exhibits large uctuations over relatively short periods of time. For instance,
PPP between the US and Mexico increased by 52 percent from 1981 to 1982, by 41 percent
1See, for example, McCormick and Wahba (2001), Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002), Mesnard (2004), Osili
(2005), Djaji´c (2010), Demurger and Xu (2011), Wahba and Zenou (2012), Djaji´c and Vinogradova (2015), and
Qian et al. (2016). See also Jones and Pardthaisong (1999) and Sobieszczyk (2000) for the consumption and
investment behavior of temporary Thai migrants after return to their villages. In the case of Philippines, Go et
al (1983) report that migrant households possessed many more household conveniences and consumer durables,
such that they enjoyed a standard of living, as measured by the composite index of socioeconomic status, that
was 2.5 times higher than that of non-migrant households.
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from 1994 to 1995, and by 22 percent from 2008 to 2009, while PPP between Germany and
Turkey increased by 41 percent from 1979 to 1980, by 36 percent from 1993 to 1994 and by 27
percent from 2000 to 2001.
The focus of our theoretical model is on the responsiveness of a temporary migrants saving
rate to changes in the exchange rate and the price level back home. More specically, we
consider the impact of an unanticipated shock in these price variables, as well as its timing,
on a migrants saving behavior in two distinct cases. In one case a migrant nds it optimal
to return to the home country before the age of retirement and to continue working at home,
while also consuming the savings accumulated abroad. We refer to this as an interior solution
from the perspective of a temporary migrants optimal timing of return. The other case is the
corner solution, where a migrant returns to the home country only for the purpose of retiring
and enjoying consumption at a relatively lower cost than abroad.
When an interior solution is optimal, we nd that a migrants saving rate abroad declines
with an increase in the source-country price level, but is ambiguously a¤ected by an increase
in the exchange rate. If source-country ination drives prices and the exchange rate up in
the same proportion, the net e¤ect on the saving rate is negative, while the magnitude of this
decline is una¤ected by the timing of the price shock within a migrants period of residence
abroad. These results are somewhat di¤erent from the ones we obtain when a migrant nds
it optimal to choose the corner solution for the timing of return. We nd once again that her
saving rate decreases with a rise in the price level of the source country, but now her saving
rate unambiguously increases in response to a nominal depreciation of domestic currency under
the realistic assumption that the degree of concavity of her utility function is less than unity.
Interestingly, unlike in the case of an interior solution, this increase in the saving rate is found
to be larger, the shorter the period of time between the realization of the price shock and the
migrants retirement date (which in this case coincides with her return date). Moreover, when
the price level and the exchange rate increase in the same proportion, the saving rate decreases.
For a given increase in the nominal exchange rate, the decrease in the saving rate is larger
the stronger is the real appreciation of domestic currency. Such real currency appreciation 
i.e., decline in purchasing power parity (PPP) has indeed been experienced over time by the
principal source countries of migration in our data set.
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We test the implications of our theoretical model using data from the German Socioeco-
nomic Panel (GSOEP) for 2013.2 This includes annual data on immigrantsmonthly savings
in the host country from 1992 to 2013, as well as a rich set of information on immigrants
individual-level characteristics. We combine this information on immigrants from 92 di¤erent
source countries with their source-country-level characteristics. A particularly helpful feature
of the GSOEP, from the perspective of this study, is that it also includes annual data on immi-
grantsreturn intentions. This allows us to test how the intensity of return intentions inuences
the way changes in the exchange rate and the price levels a¤ect migrantssaving decisions.
The data on return intentions indicate that the majority of immigrants do in fact intend to
return at or around the age of retirement. The theoretical framework that is most relevant for
testing is therefore the one focusing on the corner solution. The empirical evidence is strongly
supportive of the implications of this model. We nd that saving increases in the nominal
exchange rate but decreases in the source-country price level. A 10-percent increase in the
nominal exchange rate (appreciation of the Euro against the source-country currency) brings
about an 8.3-percent increase in saving, whereas a 10-percent increase in the source-country
price level causes a 7.9-percent decrease in saving. Moreover, in line with the predictions of
our theoretical model, the absolute magnitude of both relationships increases as the amount of
time left until a migrants retirement becomes shorter. For instance, just before retirement, a
10-percent increase in the nominal exchange rate brings about a 17.6-percent increase in saving.
Furthermore, as we gradually restrict the sample to individuals with stronger return intentions,
the estimated magnitudes and their statistical signicance also become gradually higher. Thus,
for example, if we restrict the sample to individuals who report a return intention more than
60 percent of the time, a 10-percent increase in the nominal exchange rate leads to a 27-percent
increase in saving. This is in contrast with the 8.3-percent increase that we observe for the
entire sample.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature related
to our study, Section 3 develops and analyzes our theoretical model, while Section 4 describes
the data used in our empirical investigation, explains our estimation strategy and presents the
2Data on savings of immigrants are typically available in household surveys, but the fraction of immigrants,
unless oversampled, is quite low. One survey that does in fact oversample immigrant households is the German
Socioeconomic Panel.
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ndings. Finally, Section 5 o¤ers concluding remarks.
2 Contribution to the Literature
Our study builds on the theoretical and empirical literature which considers the role of price
variables in inuencing the behavior of temporary migrants. On the theoretical side, Djaji´c
(1989) examines how wages and prices at home and abroad a¤ect a migrants pattern of con-
sumption and labor supply in the two economies. Those prices, however, are assumed to remain
unchanged throughout a migrants stay abroad, an assumption used in practically all subse-
quent theoretical contributions to the literature on the saving behavior and return decisions
of temporary immigrants.3 By contrast, our focus in the present study is on the implications
of unanticipated changes in the exchange rate or the price level at a point in time within a
migrants planning horizon when she is already in the foreign country and is in the process of
accumulating savings for the purpose of nancing consumption expenditures after return.
To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature, both theoretical and empirical, has
not established a causal relationship between unanticipated exchange-rate or price-level shocks
experienced by migrants and their saving behavior. There are, nonetheless, a number of studies
that address other dimensions of migrantsbehavior in response to unanticipated changes in the
exchange rate. Two inuential papers by Yang (2006, 2008) are prominent examples. His work
examines the extent to which increased valuation of foreign-currency holdings experienced by
Filipino migrants during the Asian nancial crisis can a¤ect remittance ows and potentially
trigger investment in entrepreneurial activity back home, by enabling migrant households to
overcome liquidity constraints they might face in meeting the minimum investment requirement
on a project. Using the 1997 Asian nancial crisis as a source of exogenous variation in the
exchange rate faced by Filipino migrants in dozens of destination countries, he shows that
immigrants timing of return migration, remitting behavior, and investments in the source
country are signicantly a¤ected by unanticipated changes in the exchange rate.4
As Yang does for the case of Filipino migrants, K¬rdar (2009) nds that the real exchange
rate a¤ects return migration hazard rates of immigrants in Germany. The direction of the e¤ect
3See, for example, Dustmann (2001), Djaji´c (2014), Djaji´c and Vinogradova (2015), and Vinogradova (2016).
4Faini (1994) is an earlier study on the relationship between exchange rate shocks and remittance ows.
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in the two studies, however, is not the same, presumably due to the marked di¤erence between
the two datasets in terms of immigrantsaverage duration of residence in the host country.
In a follow-up paper, K¬rdar (2013) shows that immigrantsreturn intentions also respond to
changes in the real exchange rate. Abarcar (2017) examines the relationship between exchange-
rate shocks and return migration in the case of migrants residing in Australia. He nds that a
favorable shock leads to a decline in the probability of return, providing evidence for rejecting
the target-earning hypothesis and in favor of the life-cycle considerations.5
Two more recent papers, Nekoei (2013) and Nguyen and Duncan (2017), investigate a
causal link between migrantslabor-market outcomes and real-exchange-rate shocks. As is the
case with other contributions to this literature, they do not examine the implications for a
migrants saving behavior. In fact the simple income-sharing model of Nekoei (2013) is based
on the assumption that migrant households consume all of their current income.6
Thus a key distinction between the present study and these earlier contributions is that
the latter lack data on migrantssaving rates abroad. This prevents them from testing directly
the relationship between unanticipated exchange-rate shocks and migrants saving. Instead,
they focus on establishing causal relationships between exchange-rate shocks and certain other
dimensions of immigrantsbehavior. It is also important to note that while migrants in Yangs
studies are mostly short-term guest workers residing in dozens of host countries, our data
set contains information on immigrants from numerous source countries with a wide range of
residence durations in a single host country, Germany. Moreover, Yangs data is on remittance
receipts and expenditure patterns of households left behind, while we observe actual earnings
5Using a structural model of return migration and saving behavior of immigrants in Germany, Kirdar (2012)
also uses the variation in PPP across countries to identify the structural parameters of that model which he
uses to examine the scal impact of immigrants.
6Ngyuyen and Duncan (2017) follow Nekoei (2013) in examining the causal link between migrantslabor-market
outcomes and the exchange rate in the Australian context. While the dataset in Nekoei (2013) is cross sectional,
Ngyuyen and Duncan (2017) exploit the panel structure of their data, which allows them to account for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity by using xed-e¤ects methods. When they do not account for time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity, they nd, as Nekoei does, that immigrants reduce their labor supply in response to
an appreciation of the host countrys currency. Once they account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity,
however, the evidence for the negative supply response disappears in the analysis by gender (Table 3 in their
text). Moreover, economic signicance is also lower for several outcomes. This result highlights the importance
of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.
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outcomes and saving behavior of migrants at the destination. This allows us to examine directly
the impact of unanticipated exchange-rate changes on their saving rates.
Within our theoretical framework, migrants make optimal saving and return-migration
decisions in a dynamic setting. This enables us to derive theoretical predictions on how the
saving rate can be a¤ected under various conditions by unanticipated movements in the price
variables. As our data set contains information on each migrants age, duration of stay abroad,
and intentions to return to the source country, we are able to test empirically our models
predictions on how such factors interact with changes in the exchange and/or the price level in
inuencing a migrants saving rate. Our theoretical analysis also helps facilitate the choice of
the most appropriate empirical specication and allows us to interpret the estimation ndings
in the context of the models predictions. Moreover, the panel structure of our data allows us
to account for a high degree of heterogeneity and our unique data on return intentions allow
us to test some more subtle, novel implications of the theoretical model.7
3 Theoretical Framework
The focus of our paper is on the e¤ects of unanticipated changes in the exchange rate and the
price level back home on the saving behavior of temporary immigrant workers. Concerning
the setting, one should think of immigrants who were recruited to meet labor shortages in
Germany during its post-war economic boom. Although their migration was expected to be
only temporary, many of these workers chose to stay for decades and even permanently as they
were able to renew their residence permits and establish (or reunite with) families in the host
country.
It is clear that for immigrants who intend to remain permanently in the host country, the
exchange rate and the price level of the source country do not play an important role, unless they
are supporting family members back home by sending remittances or plan to return periodically
for the purpose of consumption on short visits. By contrast, if migration is intended to be
temporary, changes in the exchange rate and the price level can have a signicant impact on a
migrants saving behavior as these price variables a¤ect the purchasing power of accumulated
7These data on return intentions are also used in Dustmann and Mestres (2010), which analyze the association
between return intentions and migrantssavings and asset holdings.
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assets as well as the optimal time prole of consumption while abroad and after return to the
source country.
We see saving behavior of immigrants and the timing of return to the source country as
elements of a solution to their problem of maximizing utility over a planning horizon (Djaji´c
and Milbourne, 1988). In an environment where they are subjected to unanticipated shocks,
a stay abroad that is intended to be temporary may well turn out to be permanent and vice
versa. In our theoretical analysis below, we refer to temporary (resp. permanent) migrants as
those who intend to return to their country of origin (resp. remain in the host country).8
3.1 A Temporary Migrant
As in the case of post-war migration to Germany, let us suppose that a migrants work/residence
permit is renewable, enabling her to choose how long to remain in the host country. A migrants
planning horizon is assumed to be from the time of arrival in the host country, dened as t = 0,
until t = T + R, where T is the number of years until retirement and R is the duration of the
retirement phase. There are two activities: (i) work and (ii) consumption of a standard basket
of commodities and services. After retirement, consumption is assumed to be the only activity.
While working abroad, a migrant receives at time t the wage wt , at home she receives the
home-country wage, wt, and faces the price level pt abroad and pt at home when consuming
goods. The exchange rate, or the price of one unit of foreign in terms of domestic currency at
time t, is denoted by et: We shall assume that the cost of consumption in the host country is
8The GSOEP dataset shows that 61 percent of immigrant households in Germany in 1992 indicated that they
intend to return to their country of origin. Examining various studies on the return of immigrants to their
home countries, Dustmann and Gorlach (2016) estimate that 10 years after arrival, about half of the original
arriving cohort of immigrants in European countries return to their home country whereas about 20 percent in
the group of English-speaking countries of Australia, Cananda, New Zealand, and the US return. Using rich
administrative data, Bijward et al. (2014) show that more than 60% of the immigrants in the Netherlands
return to their home country within 100 months since their arrival. Also using administrative data, Aydemir
and Robinson (2006) calculate a return-migration rate of 35% by 20 years of residence for working-age male
immigrants in Canada. Using Census and administrative data, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) nd that of the
2.6 million legal immigrants who arrived in the US between January 1, 1975 and April 1, 1980, 2.1 million were
enumerated by the 1980 Census implying a return migration rate of 17.5% within this period.
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higher than it is at home (i.e., etpt > pt), that the foreign money wage is higher than the home
wage (i.e., etwt > wt), and that the real wage is higher in the host country (i.e., w

t =p

t > wt=pt).
Our migrant is assumed to be a single individual, whose problem is to maximize V M , the
lifetime utility from consumption abroad and at home, by choosing the optimal consumption
rate at each point in time from time 0 to T + R and the optimal return date,  . The focus of
our analysis is on the problem of a migrant who intends to stay temporarily in the host country.
There are two possible solutions to a temporary migration problem: an interior solution, in the
sense that T >  > 0 and the corner solution,  = T , whereby a migrant returns to the source
country only for the purpose of retiring in that location. Let us begin by considering an interior
solution, leaving the analysis of the corner solution for Section 3.2.
To simplify the analysis and the algebra, we assume that the rate of time preference and
the rates of interest at home and abroad are equal to zero.9 Thus the objective is to maximize
V M =
Z 
0
u(ct )dt+
Z T+R

u(ct)dt; (1)
where ct and ct are the time-t rates of consumption abroad and after return to the source
country, respectively.
While abroad, a migrant saves in order to accumulate assets that later serve to support
her consumption in the home country after return at time  . Assuming that the wage rates at
home and abroad are constant, the stock of assets held abroad evolves over time according to
the following di¤erential equation: _At = w
 pt ct ; where a dot over a variable indicates a time
derivative. The stock of savings accumulated by the migrant in the form of foreign currency
until the time of return is given by
A = A

0 +
Z 
0
(w   pt ct )dt; (2)
where A0 is the initial stock of assets, net of migration costs, assumed to be held in the form
of foreign currency.10
9The role of interest di¤erentials across countries and discrepancies between the rates of interest and the rate
of time preference in inuencing saving decisions of temporary migrants and the optimal timing of their return
to the source country is examined by Djaji´c (2010). See also Djaji´c (2014a, 2014b), Djaji´c and Vinogradova
(2016) and Vinogradova (2016).
10The case in which savings are continuously remitted to the source country and held in the form of domestic
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Let us suppose that the exchange rate and the price levels in both countries are constant
over time, unless a shock occurs causing a change in one or more of these variables. The initial
values of variables are denoted by the subscript 0, while the post-disturbance values have the
subscript 1. We assume that a shock to the exchange rate or a price level is unanticipated by
a migrant and that she has static expectations (i.e. any given change in the exchange rate or
either of the price levels is expected to be permanent).
Objective function (1) is maximized subject to the constraint that the value of savings
accumulated abroad in the form of foreign currency until time  is equal to the excess of
consumption over wage earnings and retirement benets after return.
e0A

 =  
Z T

(w   p0ct)dt 
Z T+R
T
(e0b  p0ct)dt; (3)
where b is the foreign-currency-denominated ow of retirement benets enjoyed by a migrant
in the source country on the basis of her pension plan abroad.11 Let us suppose that, as in the
case of a migrant who worked in Germany, b is a fraction of the foreign wage and is increasing
in the number of years spent working abroad. For simplicity, we assume that b = w, where
 is a constant and  < 1. The budget constraint on the basis of which a migrant makes her
decisions at t = 0 concerning the optimal consumption path and the return date,  , can then
be written as follows:
e0

A0 +
Z 
0
(w   p0ct )dt

=  
Z T

(w   p0ct)dt 
Z T+R
T
[e0w
   p0ct]dt; (4)
currency is examined in the Appendix, where we show that the results regarding a migrants saving behavior
are qualitatively the same as under the assumption that the savings are held in the form of foreign currency.
Our GSOEP data set shows that the average immigrant household in Germany in 1992 remitted 2,313 Euros,
whereas it saved 4,880 Euros. Given that 61 percent of these households signaled an intention to return to
their home country, these gures suggest that migrantssavings repatriated at the point of return to the source
country may well exceed the total amount of remittances that was sent home. In fact, of the 2,313 Euros that
were remitted on average by a migrant household in 1992, only 325 Euros were remitted under the category of
"savings". This indicates that, for the most part, migrants in Germany hold their savings in Germany.
11We assume here that the pension benets earned on the basis of employment in the source country are
negligible in relation to the retirement benets earned abroad, so they can be neglected in the analysis that
follows.
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Dening the Lagrangian associated with a migrants maximization problem as
L =
Z 
0
u(ct )dt+
Z T+R

u(ct)dt+
+

e0A

0 + e0
Z 
0
(w   p0ct )dt+
Z T

(w   p0ct)dt+
Z T+R
T
[e0w
   p0ct] dt

;
the rst order conditions are
@L
@ct
= u0(ct )  e0p0 = 0; (5)
@L
@ct
= u0(ct)  p0 = 0; (6)
@L
@
= u(c )  u(c ) + [e0(w   p0c )  (w   p0c ) +Re0w] = 0 (7)
and the budget constraint (4). These four equations enable us to solve for ct; ct ;  and the La-
grange multiplier, ; as functions of the the exogenous variables a¤ecting a migrants behavior.
Since u0(ct ) and u
0(ct) are constant in eqs. (5) and (6), the corresponding rates of con-
sumption are also constant at c0 and c0, respectively. Having assumed that the price of the
standard consumption basket is relatively higher abroad, eqs. (5) and (6) imply that when
a migrant returns to the source country at t =  , her consumption jumps to a higher rate,
while u0(c0)=p0 = u0(c0)=e0p

0, so that the marginal utility per unit of a given currency spent
on consumption is the same over the two phases of the planning horizon. To be able to derive
explicit solutions in what follows, let us assume that the utility function takes the CRRA form
u(x) = x
1 
1  , where  is a measure of the degree of concavity of the utility function. In line with
the available empirical evidence, our focus in what follows will be on the case of 0 <  < 1.12
Using (5) and (6), we can write
c0 = c

0

e0p

0
p0
1=
= c0
1=
0 > c

0; (8)
where 0 =
e0p0
p0
denes the PPP relationship at the beginning of the planning horizon.
12Estimates of  vary signicantly, depending on the data used and the empirical strategy. Chetty (2006)
examines some of the factors that explain this wide range of estimates. He reports that the mean estimate in
the literature is  = 0:71, while noting that studies which combine the benets of exogenous variation with
the structural lifecycle approach, such as Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998), with its estimate of  = 0:93,
provide perhaps the most credible microeconomic estimates. Rendon and Cuecuecha (2010) provide an estimate
of  = 0:56 in the context of temporary migration from Mexico to the US.
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With the aid of (8), eq. (7) can be solved for c0 as a function of wages and prices that a
migrant faces in the two economies and the degree of concavity of her utility function.
c0 =

1  


e0w
(1 + R)  w
p0


1=
0   0
 : (9)
Note that when a migrants pension is increasing in the number of years of employment in
the foreign country (i.e.,  > 0), the benet of staying for an additional unit of time abroad
also increases, as can be seen in eq. (7). This implies a higher optimal consumption rate
abroad in eq. (9) and a correspondingly lower saving rate in comparison with the case where
the relationship between the duration of stay abroad and the magnitude of retirement benets
is not taken into account (see Djaji´c and Milbourne, 1988). Also note that in the case where an
interior solution is optimal (i.e.,  < T ), initial asset holdings do not a¤ect a migrants optimal
consumption rates in the two economies. As we shall see just below, asset holdings inuence
only the optimal duration of stay abroad.
Using (8), we can also write the budget constraint (4) as
e0A

0 + e0(w
   p0c0) + (T   )

w   p0c01=0

+R
h
e0w
   p0c01=0
i
= 0; (10)
which yields the solution for  as a function of the consumption rate abroad and the parameters
of the model, including the initial stock of assets, A0:
 =
p0c

0
1=
0 (T +R)  Tw   e0A0
e0(w   p0c0) 

w   p0c01=0

+Re0w
: (11)
We restrict the parameters to the range which ensures that  2 (0; T ). It then simply
remains to introduce the optimal c0 from eq. (9) into (11) to determine the value of  that is
just su¢ cient to enable the migrant to cover the cost of her optimal consumption program.
3.1.1 An Unanticipated Change in PPP
Our objective is to study the impact of an unanticipated change in the purchasing-power-
parity relationship between the two countries on a migrants pattern of consumption and asset
accumulation.13 In conducting our investigation, we assume that at t =  <  , (i.e., while the
13As Yang (2006) is the rst to analyze the impact of an unanticipated exchange-rate shock on a migrants
behavior, it may be useful to some readers if we compare at this point the purpose of our model and that of the
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migrant is still working abroad), there is an unanticipated change in the exchange rate and/or
one of the price levels that alters the PPP relationship. We then examine how this a¤ects the
migrants optimal consumption prole and the implied rate of asset accumulation.
Not expecting any change in the exchange rate or price levels, a migrant follows her optimal
consumption path characterized by eq. (9) and plans to return to the source country at t =  ;
as given in eq. (11). By the time an unanticipated change in the PPP relationship occurs at
time , a migrant will have accumulated (w p0c0) units of foreign currency. The problem at
t = , when the shock to PPP is realized, is to recalculate the optimal consumption program
from time  to T +R and the optimal return date, given her asset holdings at that moment.
As can be seen in eq. (9), the stock of assets held by a migrant and the amount of time
remaining within the planning horizon do not a¤ect the optimal consumption rate c0.
14 We can
then determine the impact of an unanticipated change in e; p; or p on saving and consumption
rates abroad by simply di¤erentiating (9) with respect to the relevant price variable. We also
consider the implications of an unanticipated change in w, as the wage in the source country
one presented in the Theory Appendix of Yang (2006). While we are concerned with a migrants time prole
of consumption and saving in the host country, Yangs focus is on the implications of exchange-rate shocks
for the timing of return and propensity to invest in entrepreneurial activity at home. He does not analyze
the consumption behavior of migrant workers or the implied saving behavior as his data set does not contain
direct information on these variables, but rather on the ow of remittances and the expenditure pattern of the
households left behind. In fact Yang assumes "that consumption overseas yields zero household utility: overseas
work is a pure hardship and is done exclusively for the benet of future raised consumption in the home country"
(p.2 of the Theory Appendix). While this is a plausible assumption when modeling the behavior of Filipino guest
workers on relatively short-term contracts, our framework pertains to foreign workers in Germany, most of whom
returned to their source country only after decades of work abroad. Moreover, as we have data on their saving
rates, it is essential for us to consider explicitly their optimal time prole of consumption. Another important
di¤erence is that Yang has prices of consumption goods normalized to unity while we consider explicitly the
e¤ects of changes in p and p. Moreover, in contrast with Yang (2006), the e¤ects of an exchange-rate shock
on the optimal migration duration is not our main focus and we therefore relegate derivations and discussion
of that behavior to the appendix.
14Note that our focus is on an environment in which the migrant chooses an interior solution for  . In that
case initial asset holdings a¤ect the optimal return date, but not the optimal rates of consumption, which are
determined by conditions (5)-(7). By contrast, asset holdings will clearly have an e¤ect on c when we consider
parameters of the model for which the migrant chooses to return to the source country for the purpose of
retirement (i.e.,  = T ). We examine that case in the next section.
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may change along with the price level and the exchange rate if the economy is experiencing
ination that puts upward pressure on both prices and wages. Thus the proportional change
in consumption expenditures abroad for a given percentage change in each of the relevant price
variables can be written as follows:
d(p0c

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de0
e0
p0c

0
=
w
ew(1 +R)  w  

1  



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p0c

0
=   w
ew(1 +R)  w < 0; (15)
These results concerning a migrants nominal consumption spending abroad imply that her
saving rate declines with an increase in p, but increases with an increase in p in the empirically
relevant range of  < 1. In addition, it is ambiguously a¤ected by an increase in the exchange
rate and increases with an increase in w. In the special case where source-country ination
drives p and e up in the same proportion, it can be ascertained by adding the results from
eqs. (12) and (14) that the net e¤ect on pc is positive (on the saving rate negative) and
even more so if the increase in p is greater than a given increase in e. As we shall see in
the empirical part of the paper, this in fact corresponds to the behavior of the exchange rate
and the price level in the principal source countries of migration in our data set. We should
therefore expect that in such cases of real appreciation of source-country currency the saving
rate of migrants who intend to return to their home country before retirement will tend to
decline. Note, in addition, that if the increase in p; e; and w is in the same proportion, leaving
the PPP relationship and the real wage at home una¤ected, this has no impact on a migrants
saving rate (i.e., the sum of expressions in eqs. (12), (14), and (15) is zero).
3.2 Return for Retirement Only
Conditions in the labor and goods markets at home and abroad may be such that it pays to
return to the source country only at time T . This can well be the case if a worker migrates
late in the planning horizon (small T ) and/or if the international wage di¤erential in favor of
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the host country is su¢ ciently large, while the price-level di¤erential makes it attractive for
a migrant to consume at home rather than abroad over the retirement phase of the planning
horizon. More specically, a temporary migrant chooses the corner solution when the value of
c that satises condition (9) and the corresponding rate of consumption after return to the
source country (as given by condition (8)) are not attainable within the migrants budget even
if she decides to spend her entire working life abroad. Then she must choose a lower time prole
of consumption, as dictated by conditions (5) and (6) and the budget constraint (4) (with the
duration of stay abroad set at  = T ).
The GSOEP dataset that we use to test the implications of our model contains annual
information on intentions to return. Slightly more than one half of the migrants in our sample
state at least once that they intend to return, while 31.5% do so more then 50% of the time.
The dataset also includes information on the intended duration of residence in the host country.
This allows us to calculate each migrants age at the intended point of return. The distribution
of the intended return age, given in Figure A1 in the Appendix, indicates that more than
77.7% of these migrants intend to return after the age of 55. This suggests that for most of the
migrants in the sample, the planned return is simply for the purpose of retiring back home.15
When a migrant plans to return to the source country simply for the purpose of retiring
at t = T; the optimization problem is as follows:
max
ct;ct
Z T
0
u(ct )dt+
Z T+R
T
u(ct)dt; (16)
subject to the budget constraint
e0

A0 +
Z T
0
(w   p0ct )dt

=  
Z T+R
T
(e0Tw
   ptct)dt; (17)
where T is the fraction of the foreign wage that a migrant expects to receive in the form of
pension benets after having worked abroad for T years. The solution to this problem yields the
constant optimal consumption rate abroad prior to any shock to the PPP relationship between
the two countries:
c0 =
e0A

0 + T (1 +R)e0w

Te0p0 +Rp0
1=
0
; (18)
15Using the GSOEP dataset on actual return realizations, K¬rdar (2009) and Kuhlenkasper and Steinhardt
(2017) report substantially higher return-migration hazard rates around the age of retirement.
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The solution for the constant consumption rate at home over the retirement phase of the
planning horizon is, as in the previous section, c0 = c0
1=
0 > c

0.
If there is an unanticipated change in PPP at t =  < T , a migrant will adjust her optimal
consumption rates at home and abroad in response to this change in the environment. Denoting
once again the pre-disturbance values of variables by the subscript 0 and the post-disturbance
values by the subscript 1, a migrants optimal consumption rate after return to the home
country is c1 = c1
1=
1 > c

1, while the optimal consumption rate abroad is the solution for c

1
that satises the following budget constraint.
e1[A

0 + (w
   p0c0)] + (T   )e1(w   p1c1) +R[Te1w   1=1 p1c1] = 0: (19)
We thus have
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+RT ]w
T   +R1= 11
 : (20)
To examine the sensitivity of a migrants nominal consumption expenditures abroad to
unanticipated changes in the exchange rate and the price levels at time , we di¤erentiate eq.
(20) with respect to e1; p1 and p1:
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where 1 refers to the PPP relationship following a shock to the corresponding variables. With
the empirically relevant value of  being less than unity, these expressions indicate that a
migrants nominal rate of consumption spending abroad, pc, decreases (saving rate increases)
if the home currency depreciates or the foreign price level rises and increases (saving rate
decreases) with an increase in the price level of the source country.
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Proposition 1: Suppose that  < 1: A migrants saving rate abroad (i) increases in re-
sponse to home-currency depreciation and to an increase in the foreign price level;(ii) decreases
in response to an increase in the domestic price level.
When e and p rise in the same proportion, the e¤ect on pc is:
d(p1c

1)
de1
e1
p1c

1
+
d(p1c

1)
dp1
p1
p1c

1
= 0;
indicating that consumption and saving remain unchanged, with the e¤ects of proportionately
equal changes in e and p completely o¤setting each other. In the majority of source countries
in our sample over the time period under consideration, however, dp=p > de=e. In such cases
of real appreciation of domestic currency (i.e., decline in PPP), our model implies that it is
optimal for a migrant to reduce her saving rate while abroad. Thus, given Proposition 1, we
have the following corollary:
Corollary: Suppose that  < 1: An increase in PPP has a positive impact on a migrants
saving rate abroad.
Moreover, with all the expressions on the right of eqs. (21)-(23) being identical, except for
the sign, it follows that the impact on the saving rate of a given percentage change in e; p; p or
PPP is identical when measured in absolute value. Note, in addition, that movements in the
source-country wage have no impact on pc when a migrant chooses the corner solution.
As may be seen in eqs. (21), (22), and (23), the impact on pc of any given unanticipated
change in e; p or p depends on ; the point in time along a migrants planning horizon at which
the unanticipated shock occurs. This is in contrast with our ndings in the previous subsection,
where the change in c is found to be independent of the timing of the unanticipated shock to
PPP. The role of  in the relationship between consumption and PPP is of particular interest if
we seek to understand di¤erences in the saving behavior among various cohorts of immigrants.
To examine this relationship, we di¤erentiate eqs. (21), (22), and (23) with respect to , which
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yields:
d
d

d(p1c

1)
de1
e1
p1c

1

=
R
 
 1



1= 1
1h
T   +R1= 11
i2 ? 0,  ? 1; (24)
d
d

d(p1c

1)
dp1
p1
p1c

1

=
R
 
 1



1= 1
1h
T   +R1= 11
i2 ? 0,  ? 1; (25)
d
d

d(p1c

1)
dp1
p1
p1c

1

=
R
 
1 



1= 1
1h
T   +R1= 11
i2 ? 0,  7 1: (26)
The condition  < 1 is both necessary and su¢ cient for (24) and (25) to be negative. In that
case, the decrease in the consumption spending abroad (and hence the increase in the saving
rate) in response to an unanticipated increase in the exchange rate or the foreign price level
is larger, the greater the value of  relative to T , where T is the number of years from the
time of migration to retirement. Thus the shorter the period of time between the realization
of the PPP shock and a migrants retirement date, the greater the proportional change in the
consumption rate abroad and the corresponding change in the saving rate. To see the intuition
behind this result, let us turn to eq. (24), which relates to the interaction between the e¤ect
on pc of a change in the exchange rate and . Note that when  < 1, reecting a relatively
high degree of intertemporal substitutability between consumption abroad and consumption at
home, the increase in nominal spending at home is proportionately greater than the increase
in e, for any given c, as indicated by eq. (8). This implies that more foreign currency is
needed to cover the optimal rate of consumption over the R years of retirement after return.
To support that higher rate of spending at home, the saving rate abroad has to increase and
increase more, the shorter the remaining period of time before retirement (i.e., the greater is 
for a given T). In sum, for the empirically relevant case of  < 1, the reduction in a migrants
foreign consumption rate is larger, the closer is the date of the shock to the retirement (and
hence return) date. Accordingly, as a result of an unanticipated increase in the exchange rate,
we should expect to see a larger increase in the saving rate of those migrants who have been
abroad for a relatively longer period of time, other things being equal, including a workers age
at the time of migration. The same line of reasoning can be invoked to explain eqs. (25) and
(26), which state that the response of a migrants consumption spending abroad to a change in
the foreign (resp. home) price level is more negative (resp. positive), the larger is  relative to
T . We summarize the results in
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Proposition 2: Suppose that  < 1: The response of a migrants saving rate to changes
in the exchange rate or the price levels at home and abroad is stronger as the number of years
until retirement and return migration becomes smaller.
These ndings are in sharp contrast with the presumption that an appreciation of foreign
currency makes a migrant "wealthier" in the sense of increasing the purchasing power at home
of the savings accumulated in the form of foreign currency, so that she can reduce her saving
rate for the remainder of her stay abroad and still meet her expenditures during the retirement
phase in the source country. Reasoning along these lines neglects the fact that an increase in
e also creates a larger wedge between the optimal values of c and c, which entails an increase
in the foreign-currency value of the savings needed to support the optimal consumption rate
for the R years of retirement after return. Hence the shorter the time period T    over which
these additional savings can possibly be accumulated abroad, the larger must be the drop in
c.
A change in PPP can come about as a result of a change in e, p, p or some combination
thereof. In relation to Proposition 2, we should point out that eqs. (24) - (26) imply that
regardless of what combination of changes in e, p, and p brings about a change in PPP,
the impact on a migrants saving rate is stronger, the shorter the period of time between the
realization of the shock and the expected date of return migration.
4 The Evidence
4.1 Data
The micro-level data in our empirical analysis come from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP). It is a large and nationally representative panel data of households in Germany,
which includes foreigners as well as Germans. The initial wave of GSOEP in 1984 started with
an oversample of foreigners in Germany from ve main source countries (Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia,
Greece, Italy, and Spain). Although immigrants from these countries still constitute a major
part of the immigrant sample in GSOEP, there is also a large group of immigrants from about
a hundred di¤erent countries of origin. We use the 2013 version of GSOEP, which includes
annual data from 1984 to 2013. The dataset is very rich with respect to the socio-demographic
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and economic characteristics of individuals. An important advantage of the GSOEP is that it
also has low attrition (Knies and Spiess, 2007).
Since our dependent variable, monthly savings (or simply savings, hereafter), is measured
at the household level, we conduct our analysis also at the household level. We proceed by
extracting from all subsamples of the GSOEP those households whose head is an immigrant.16
Our denition of an immigrant is restricted to people with migration background who arrived
in Germany after age 18. We place this age restriction because, as we interpret return migration
as part of optimal life-cycle decisions, the individual must have made the decision to migrate
himself/herself. We include in our sample ethnic Germans who immigrated to Germany after
age 18. However, we exclude households headed by Germans who lived temporarily abroad and
arrived in Germany after age 18.
We also restrict the sample of source countries in line with the assumptions of our theoretical
model. First, we drop immigrants from countries where PPP averages below one over the period
of time covered by our data, because the principal motive for immigration of these individuals
is unlikely to have been the accumulation of savings.17 Second, since the model assumes that
wages in the host country are higher than those in the source country, we drop countries where
GDP per capita averages are higher than that of Germany over the same period of time. This
assumes that GDP per capita is a good proxy for wages in these developed countries.18
In addition, we lose some households due to the missing information on the country of origin
or the lack of availability of macro-level data for the country of origin. First, there are some
individuals in GSOEP whose reported country of origin does not comply with UN denitions
of country names (making it impossible to obtain macro-level data) or whose country of origin
is unspecied.19 Moreover, for two countries, we do not have data on macro variables for any
16The immigrant samples in the GSEOP are refreshed over time to sustain representability of immigrant groups.
We use all immigrant households in these subsamples. See www.diw.se for further information about the
sampling frame of GSOEP.
17These countries are Norway, Denmark, Japan, Switzerland, New Zealand, Sweden, Australia, Finland, Ireland,
Great Britain, Luxembourg, France, and the Netherlands.
18The countries that are dropped with this restriction include Austria, USA, Australia, Canada, Ireland, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, and Kuwait.
19The former group of reported country-of-origin names include Benelux, No Nationality, Kurdistan, Palestine,
Taiwan, Africa, and Eastern Europe.
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year in the data window: ex-Yugoslavia and Somalia. Most of the missing observations due to
the lack of information on the country of origin or missing macro-level data for the country of
origin come from ex-Yugoslavian immigrants.
We put this sample of immigrant household heads into person-year format and follow them
from the time they enter the data to the time they drop from the sample or until 2013. We
drop person-year observations in which the household head is aged 65 or over (in accordance
with the retirement age in Germany) because the theoretical model whose implications we are
testing is about the saving behavior of immigrants until retirement. In addition, since the
question on household savings was introduced to the survey in 1992, the sample in our analysis
is restricted to the 1992-2013 period. In the question on savings, households are asked about
the amount of their monthly savings, on average, for larger purchases, emergency expenses or to
accumulate wealth.20 This variable, however, is censored below at zero because households are
not asked about dissaving. The other variables that come from the GSOEP include years since
migration, annual household post-government income, household size, number of employed
individuals in the household, and dummies for the following outcomes of household heads:
employed, married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse. All values (monthly
savings, household income) are normalized in 2010 Euros. Values of household income variable
that are in the top 1 and bottom 1 percentiles are dropped.
While we use monthly savings as the dependent variable in our main analysis, we also
use the saving rate as the dependent variable in certain robustness checks. However, there are
some challenges in dening the saving rate because monthly savings divided by monthly income
has in some instances values greater than one due to noise in the data. In fact, of the 11,080
observations in which saving rate is available, 60 have a saving rate greater than one. A common
approach to handle this kind of outliers is to trim the lower and upper outliers as we do with
household income; however, in this setting, since savings are censored below at zero, it is not
possible to trim the bottom outliers. Therefore, we take the following approach to deal with the
outliers in the saving rate variable. First, we generate a variable for the minimum consumption
needs of households using the social assistance welfare scheme in Germany, which calculates the
20The exact wording of the question is as follows: "Do you usually have an amount of money left over at the
end of the month that you can save for larger purchases, emergency expenses or to acquire wealth? If yes, how
much?"
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minimum consumption needs of households according to the household composition based on
a formula.21 Then, using the reported household income and generated minimum consumption
needs, we calculate potential savings (i.e., the maximum amount of savings that each household
can accumulate in a month). When the reported monthly savings are higher than the potential
savings, we replace the reported savings with the potential savings. We call this nal savings
variable adjusted savings. The saving rate is calculated as the ratio of adjusted savings to
household income.
GSOEP also includes a unique question on immigrantswillingness to return to their home
countries. If an immigrant indicates an intention to return, he/she is also asked about the
number of years of intended duration of residence in Germany. We utilize this information in
our empirical analysis in distinguishing between immigrants who intend to return and those who
do not. Using this unique information on the intention to return, we generate four subsamples
of which the rst one includes immigrants who report at least once an intention to return across
the surveys (sample B) and the other three samples include immigrants who report an intention
to return at least 20 percent of the time (sample C), at least 40 percent of the time (sample
D), and at least 60 percent of the time (sample E) across the surveys.
We combine our micro-level dataset with a number of auxiliary datasets. Annual data
on PPP and exchange rates for source-countries and on the consumer price index in Germany
come from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank. We combine
these three pieces of information to calculate the annual consumer price index in each source
country. The last piece of data from the WDI is GDP per capita (in constant 2010 US dollars)
for all source countries in the sample.
Finally, we obtain data on political violence at the country level from the MEPV dataset.
This dataset includes information on both interstate conict and societal conict. Interstate
21If household income falls below this minimum consumption level, the German state makes up for the di¤erence.
In calculating this minimum consumption level, the following formula is used by the German government. A
single household head receives 409 Euros per month, whereas adult couples receive 368 Euros per month each.
Additionally, an amount is given per each child, depending on the age of the child, where the minimum amount
is 237 Euros per month (all in 2017 prices). In order to be on the conservative side, we use the following formula
in our data: 407 + (household size - 1) * 237. In accordance with the other prices in our data, we convert this
value to 2010 prices.
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conict covers international violence and international warfare, whereas societal conict covers
civil violence, civil warfare, ethnic violence and ethnic warfare. Each item is given a score from
1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). We use the aggregate political violence score, which is the sum of
these six items.
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on individual-level characteristics in panel (A) and on
country-level characteristics in panel (B) for the household heads in our sample. Individual-level
characteristics are further divided into two panels; panel (A1) gives descriptive statistics for the
2,966 individuals in the sample whereas panel (A2) gives descriptive statistics for the 11,080
person-year observations across the panel. According to panel (A1), the mean age at arrival
is about 30, and 65 percent of the household heads are male. Panel (A2) shows that positive
savings are reported in 44 percent of the person-year observations, and the mean amount of the
reported monthly non-negative savings is about 245 Euros. The saving rate we generate using
the minimum consumption approach has a mean value of 0.084 and a maximum value of 0.886.
An intention to return home is reported in only 29 percent of the person-year observations. In
the panel, both the average time since migration and the average time to retirement are almost
18 years and the average age is 47. While the fraction of observations in which individuals are
married is 0.8, the majority of spouses and underage children reside in Germany. In terms of
country-level characteristics, panel (B) shows that the average PPP is 2.42. Before we further
describe the country-level key variables of interest using graphical analysis, we examine how
descriptive statistics vary across the ve samples dened by immigrantsreturn intentions.
Table 1 about here
Table A1 in the Appendix shows how the descriptive statistics vary by return intentions
using the ve samples described above. Male household heads have stronger return intentions
than female household heads. Whether or not immigrants make positive savings does not
change with their return intentions, although the level of savings increases considerably with
return intentions. While the average monthly savings is about 245 Euros in the full sample, it
gradually increases as we place stronger restrictions on return intentions and reaches 332 Euros
in sample E, which includes immigrants who report a return intention at least 60 percent of
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the time. Similarly, the saving rate increases from 8 percent to 11 percent from the full sample
to sample E. While the mean years to retirement is almost 18 years for sample A, it is between
15 and 16 years for all other samples. Neither household income nor the employment status of
the household head depends much on return intentions; however, the total number of employed
individuals in the household increases by about 10 percent from sample A to sample B. The
probability of the spouse or the child being abroad also increases with return intentions.
Next, we examine how our macro-level key variables of interest evolve over time for the
10 source countries in our sample with the highest fraction of immigrants. In the Appendix,
the PPP between these countries and Germany, the log exchange rate of these countries with
Germany, and the log price level in these source countries are shown in Figures A2, A3, and A4,
respectively. Figure A2 shows substantial shocks to PPP for some countries in certain years.
For instance, the PPP between the German currency and the Turkish Lira increases from 2.68
to 3.64 from 1993 to 1994 (36 percent) with the economic crisis in Turkey, the PPP between
Germany and Croatia jumps from 2.35 to 4.10 (74 percent) from 1991 to 1992 with the onset
of the war in Croatia, and the PPP between Germany and Russia jumps from 3.21 to 4.52 (41
percent) from 1998 to 1999.
When we examine the exchange rate and source-country price variables, we see a signicant
co-movement between these variables, as expected. However, there are important divergences
at certain years, as reected in the movement of the PPP over time in Figure A2. If source
country prices fully adjusted to the shocks in the exchange rate or vice versa, PPP would remain
constant. This, however, is obviously not the case. For instance, the exchange rate between the
Euro and the Turkish Lira increased by 90 percent from 2000 to 2001 due to the economic crisis
in Turkey, whereas the PPP relationship between the two countries increased by 27 percent.
Similarly, in the 1997-98 economic crisis in the Philippines, the exchange rate with Germany
increased by 37 percent, while PPP rose by only 13 percent. In some cases, due to sluggish
adjustment in source-country prices, the response of PPP matches more closely movements in
the exchange rate. The case of the Philippines from 2002 to 2003 is one example. While the
exchange rate increased by 26 percent, PPP jumped by 22 percent.
Divergence between changes in the exchange rate and the source-country price level which
represents changes in the PPP variable over time is critical for our identication strategy.
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It is also important to highlight two other notable features of our key macro-level variables
of interest. First, when we compare the evolution of PPP over time for the various source
countries in Figure A2, we observe an important co-movement across source countries, which
presumably results from shocks in Germany that are common to all source countries. Second,
both the exchange rate and source-country price level variables have visible time trends. In our
estimation, it is therefore very important to account for time e¤ects that capture the shocks in
Germany that are common for immigrants from all source countries.
4.2 Empirical Specication and Estimation
In order to test for the implications of the theoretical model regarding the relationship between
immigrants saving behavior and the key macro-level variables (Proposition 1), we use the
following empirical specication,
si;t = 0 + 1 eri;t 1 + 2 pHi;t 1 + x
0
it  + t +  i + "i;t; (27)
where si;t is monthly savings of individual i at time t, eri;t 1 is the exchange rate between
Germany and individual is home country at time t  1, pHi;t 1 is the price level at time t  1 in
the home country of individual i. These variables all enter in logarithmic form; hence, we can
interpret the parameters 1 and 2 as elasticities. xit stands for the set of control variables for
individual i at time t, t stands for time dummies,  i captures xed e¤ects, and " is the error
term. According to implications of the theoretical model, we expect our key parameters of
interest 1 to be positive and 2 to be negative. Most interviews in the GSOEP are conducted
in the rst half of the year. We therefore use prices of the previous year in equation (27). To
test the implications of our model regarding how the e¤ects of the key macro-level variables
change by years to retirement (Proposition 2), we modify the above specication as follows,
si;t = 0 + 1eri;t 1 + 2(eri;t 1  ytrit) + 3 pHi;t 1 + 4(pHi;t 1  ytrit) (28)
+5 (p
G
t 1  ytrit) + x
0
it + t +  i + i;t:
where ytrit is the number of years to retirement for individual i at time t, pGt 1 is the price
level in Germany at time t   1, and  is the error term. In accordance with our model, we
expect 1 and 4 to be positive and 2; 3; and 5 to be negative. The control variables, x,
include the key characteristics of the household and household head pertaining to their saving
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behavior: household income and household size (both in logarithmic form), employment status
of the household head, the number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies
for married, child abroad, spouse abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household
head, in addition to dummies for the duration of residence of the household head in Germany.22
While we cannot identify the e¤ect of the price level in Germany, which varies only over time
(and we have time dummies in equation (27)), the interaction term of the price level in Germany
with time to retirement, which varies both over time and over individuals, can be identied in
equation (28).
A potential specication concern in equation (27) is that our key macro-level variables could
partly stand for other macro-level variables such as GDP per capita or political conict status
that may also a¤ect the saving rate. For instance, if there is an economic crisis in Turkey, not
only would the exchange rate and prices in Turkey change, but family members of a migrant
back in Turkey may also demand more remittances due to their lower income, which would
possibly come at the expense of a migrants savings. Similarly, unexpected political instability
in Turkey may not only inuence economic conditions and therefore the exchange rate with
the Euro, but also an immigrant households return plans and therefore its saving behavior.
Accordingly, control variables in X also include per-capita GDP in the source countries (in
logarithmic form) as well as an index of political conict.
Macro-level shocks in Germany could also be confounding the e¤ects of our key macro
variables in equation (27). Suppose that a negative economic shock changes the way natives
perceive immigrants in Germany. This in turn may a¤ect immigrantspropensity to return to
their home country and their saving behavior in addition to having a direct inuence on the
exchange rate and prices in Germany. To account for these types of shocks, we include calendar
year dummies, which are common for immigrants from di¤erent countries and serve to capture
the e¤ect of macro-level shocks in Germany.
We estimate equations (27) and (28) using di¤erent panel data estimation methods. In
order to account for the censored nature of the savings variable, we use Tobit models. Since
22We divide the frequency distribution of the duration of residence variable into 8 equal parts. The resulting
dummy variables are for the following ranges of the duration of residence variable: 7-9, 10-13, 13-17, 18-21,
22-26, 27-31, 32+.
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unconditional xed-e¤ects Tobit models are biased (due to the so-called incidental parameters
problem), we use the semiparametric estimator for xed-e¤ects Tobit models developed by
Honore (1992). This is our preferred Tobit estimation method because it eliminates time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. We also use Tobit random-e¤ects model and Mundlak-
Chamberlain approach to check the robustness of our ndings.
Propositions one and two of the theoretical model are derived under the assumption that
immigrants return at the time of retirement. We would therefore expect them to be more
relevant for immigrants who in fact intend to return. We run our estimations on the full sample
as well as the four subsamples dened by return intentions, explained in the Data Section, to
determine whether the evidence in support of Propositions 1 and 2 becomes stronger as we
gradually tighten the restriction on return intention.
4.3 Empirical Findings
We begin our empirical analysis by presenting in Figure 1 the raw relationships between immi-
grantsmonthly savings and our key price variables of interest the exchange rate, the source-
country price level, and PPP after controlling for source-country and time dummies. The
raw relationships suggest that the exchange rate is positively and the source-country price
level is negatively associated with immigrantssavings. These initial results are in line with
Proposition 1 of our theoretical model. Furthermore, the raw relationships indicate a positive
relationship between PPP and savings, which is also consistent with Proposition 1. We now
present results from our econometric models which are conditional on the full set of control
variables and individual xed-e¤ects.
Figure 1 about here
Table 2 presents the main estimation results in two panels; panel (A) shows the e¤ects of the
elements of the PPP variable the nominal exchange rate, the source-country price level, and
the host-country price level and panel (B) shows the e¤ect of the PPP variable. In each panel,
the results are given for ve separate samples: the full sample and the four subsamples dened
by return intentions. For each sample, two separate regressions are presented. Proposition 1 is
tested using the specication in equation (27) in the odd-numbered columns, and Proposition
2 is tested using the specication in equation (28) in the even-numbered columns.
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As can be seen in all odd-numbered columns in panel (A) of Table 2, the estimates conrm
Proposition 1: monthly savings increase in the exchange rate and decrease in the source-
country price level. While the coe¢ cients are statistically signicant for all samples, both the
magnitude of coe¢ cients and their statistical signicance increase substantially as we gradually
restrict the sample to individuals with stronger return intentions from sample (A) to sample
(E). Quantitatively, the elasticity of savings with respect to the exchange rate is 0.83 with the
full sample. It increases to 1.64 with sample (B), exceeds 2.1 with sample (C), and exceeds 2.6
with samples (D) and (E). The magnitude of the elasticity with respect to the source-country
price level is similar but has the opposite sign.
The evidence for Proposition 2 is given in the even-numbered columns in panel (A) of Table
2. The positive e¤ect of the exchange rate and the negative e¤ect of the source-country price
level both diminish as the number of years to retirement increases. However, the interaction
term of the exchange rate becomes statistically signicant at the 5 percent level only with sam-
ples (D) and (E) the samples in which immigrants have stronger return intentions whereas
the interaction term of the source-country price level is statistically signicant with the full
sample, as well as with samples (D) and (E). It is important to note that the interaction terms
of both variables become gradually larger in magnitude as the restriction on return intention
increases from column (2) to column (10).
The only part of our propositions that the data do not produce evidence for is the part of
Proposition 2 with regard to how the e¤ect of host country prices vary with years to retirement.
While the coe¢ cient estimates in the even-numbered columns in Table 2 are consistent with
Proposition 2 in that the e¤ect of host country prices decreases in years to retirement, the
estimates are not statistically signicant at the conventional levels except for that with sample
(A). The lack of evidence for this variable is perhaps not surprising because there is only time
variation in host country prices unlike the other two elements of PPP for which there is also
cross-country variation.
Table 2 about here
As can be seen in panel (B) of Table 2, the patterns for the e¤ect of PPP over the two
specications and ve samples are very similar to those in panel (A). There is evidence for
a positive e¤ect of PPP on the saving rate with all samples. Moreover, as the degree of
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the restriction on return intentions is strengthened, the coe¢ cient estimates become larger in
magnitude and statistical signicance increases. Quantitatively, the elasticity of savings with
respect to PPP is very similar in absolute terms to the elasticity of savings with respect to
the exchange rate and with respect to the source-country price level. Our theoretical model
in fact implies that the absolute value of these elasticities should be the same. In fact, formal
hypothesis testing reveals that there is no evidence that the coe¢ cients of the exchange rate
and source-country price level variables in the odd-numbered columns are di¤erent for any of
the ve samples.
In order to understand how the e¤ects of the exchange rate and of the source-country price
level change with years to retirement, we use our estimates from Table 2 to calculate the joint
e¤ects for years to retirement ranging from 0 to 40 and display these in Table 3. With the full
sample, there is evidence for a positive e¤ect of the exchange rate and for a negative e¤ect of
the source-country price level as long as the number of years to retirement is 20 or less. At
15 years to retirement, which is 2 years below the median of 17, the absolute values of the
elasticity of savings with respect to the exchange rate and with respect to the source-country
price level are both close to unity. Given that the mean saving rate is about 8 percent, a
10-percent increase in the exchange rate brings about a 0.8 percentage-point increase in the
saving rate. Just before retirement, the absolute value of the elasticity of savings with respect
to either variable exceeds 1.75 with the full sample.
When we examine the estimates across di¤erent samples in Table 3, we observe that the
evidence for Proposition 1 exists in all ve samples when the number of years to retirement is 15
or less. In addition, the estimated elasticities become higher as we gradually restrict the sample
based on return intentions from sample (A) to sample (E). For instance, the estimated elasticity
with sample (E) at 15 years to retirement implies that a 10-percent increase in the exchange
rate brings about a 27.8-percent increase in savings, which is equivalent to a 2.2 percentage-
point increase in the saving rate, given its mean value of 8 percent. At the same time, the range
of years to retirement for which there is evidence for Proposition 1 widens from sample (A) to
sample (B). The evidence for Proposition 1 exists even at 25 years to retirement with sample
(B). However, as we make even stronger restrictions on return intentions in samples (C) to (E),
the range of years to retirement for which there is evidence for Proposition 1 narrows as the
e¤ect of smaller sample size starts to dominate.
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Table 3 about here
Finally, we briey discuss the ndings with regard to other control variables, which are given
in Table A2 in the Appendix. There is strong evidence, as expected, that savings increase in
household income and decrease in household size. The estimated income elasticity of savings
is quite high, with a value above three. Savings also increase in the employment status of
the household head, although once the employment status of the household head is accounted
for, the total number of employed individuals in the household does not have a statistically
signicant e¤ect on savings. Among the other characteristics of the household head that are
included in the regression, the location of children is the only variable which has a statistically
signicant e¤ect: savings increase when there are children in the home country. As for the
relationship between savings and the duration of residence, it seems to be hump shaped. After
accounting for all other factors, savings at 7-13 years of residence are higher than they are at
0-6 years of residence. There is no evidence, however, for a di¤erence between savings at 0-6
years of residence and savings after 13 years of residence.
4.3.1 Robustness Checks
The above ndings conrm the two propositions of our theoretical model. In this section,
we turn our attention to the robustness of our ndings. The battery of sensitivity checks we
conduct include the use of alternative sets of control variables, including country-specic time
trends, the use of alternative denitions of the dependent variable, examining whether missing
observations in our dependent variables cause a bias, and the use of alternative estimation
methods.
Alternative Set of Controls
Table 4 shows the sensitivity of our ndings to the use of alternative sets of control variables.
The specications in panel (A) include only time dummies and duration of residence dummies
in addition to the key country-level variables. In panel (B), we add the country-level covariates
other than the key country-level variables to the set of controls in panel (A); and in panel (C), we
add only the individual-level covariates used in Table 2 to the set of controls in panel (A). The
coe¢ cient estimates in the odd-numbered columns of Table 4, used in the test of Proposition
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1, are very similar to those in Table 2.23 The estimates in all even-numbered columns of panels
(A) and (B) of Table 4 provide supporting evidence for Proposition 2 regardless of the sample.
However, once we include individual level covariates in panel (C) of Table 4, the evidence for
Proposition 2 becomes limited to the full sample and the two samples with the strongest return
intentions which is consistent with the main ndings in Table 2. We repeat the exercise in
Table 4 with PPP as the key variable of interest in Table A3 in the Appendix. Again, the
results vary little in comparison to those in Table 2.
Table 4 about here
In another sensitivity check with regard to the set of control variables, we add country-
specic time trends to the set of control variables in Table 2. When we interpret equation (27) as
a di¤erence-in-di¤erences framework where we compare countries over time, we are making the
common-trend assumption across countries in savings. However, if there are di¤erent trends
in savings across countries and the degree of trend is correlated with the change in macro-
level variables, we would have a specication problem. To account for this possibility, we add
country-specic time trends.24 As can be seen in Table 5, while the estimates still provide
supporting evidence for Proposition 1, both the coe¢ cient magnitudes in absolute terms and
their statistical signicance are somewhat lower. The coe¢ cient of the exchange rate variable
across the ve samples is roughly a quarter lower and its statistical signicance is limited
to sample (C). The coe¢ cient of the source-country price level variable is also lower with
samples (A) and (B), but not much di¤erent with the other samples. Moreover, its statistical
signicance persists in all samples (B) to (D). The results of the estimation of equation (28)
show that evidence for Proposition 2 exists with samples (D) and (E) for both the exchange
rate and source-country price level variables, which is in line with main ndings in Table 2. In
essence, our key ndings hold with this demanding specication (given our modest sample size)
despite lower overall statistical signicance and somewhat lower coe¢ cient estimates.
23The only notable di¤erence is that statistical signicance falls just below the 10 percent level with the full
sample in panels (A) and (B); however, once we account for the variation in individual-level characteristics in
panel (C), standard errors fall and statistical signicance at the 10 percent level emerges with the full sample as
in Table 2.
24This specication check has been ignored by the previous literature on the link between PPP and migrants
economic behavior.
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Table 5 about here
Alternative Dependent Variable
In the second set of robustness checks, we examine the robustness of our ndings to the
use of alternative denitions of the dependent variable. Table 6 presents the estimation results
when the dependent variable is a dummy variable for positive savings.25 Overall, the patterns
in Table 6 are very similar to those in Table 2. Statistical signicance is overall higher in Table
6 than it is in Table 2 in relation to the evidence for both propositions. For instance, there is
evidence for Proposition 1 at least at the 5-percent level even with the full sample; and, there
is evidence for Proposition 2 with sample (C) in addition to that with samples (D) and (E).
Quantitatively, the results imply that a 10-percent increase in the exchange rate leads to a 0.76
percentage-point increase in the probability of a positive saving outcome with the full sample.
(The baseline level of the percentage of a positive saving outcome is 44 percent.) As expected,
this e¤ect is much larger for samples restricted to individuals with stronger return intentions.
A 10-percent increase in the exchange rate brings about a 1.7 percentage-point increase with
sample (B) and more than a 2.3 percentage-point increase with samples (D) and (E).
Table 6 about here
In another robustness check of our ndings to the denition of the savings variable, we
use the saving rate as the dependent variable. The estimation results with this dependent
variable, presented in Table 7, show that our key ndings hold. Overall, while the statistical
evidence for Proposition 1 is somewhat weaker, the statistical evidence for Proposition 2 is
much stronger than that presented in Table 2. In fact, the evidence for Proposition 2 holds
across all samples in Table 7. Quantitatively, with the full sample, a 10-percent increase in the
exchange rate brings about a 0.56 percentage-point increase in the saving rate whereas a 10-
percent increase in the source-country price level has a similar e¤ect in the opposite direction.
While the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients increase as we move from sample (A) to (E), as in
other tables, the statistical signicance for Proposition 1 diminishes faster in this case and is
lost with sample (E) completely.
25Note that the sample size is slightly higher than that in Table 2 due to a lower number of missing observations
for this variable compared to the level of savings variable used in Table 2. The estimation results when the
sample is kept the same as that in Table 2 are provided in Table A4 in the Appendix, where the results change
only trivially.
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Table 7 about here
We present the results when no correction is made for saving rate values above one in Table
A5 in the Appendix. Here, the evidence becomes stronger in terms of statistical signicance.
Moreover, the coe¢ cient magnitudes are larger; a 10-percent increase in the nominal exchange
rate causes a 2.9 to 3.8 percentage-points increase in the saving rate according to samples
(B) to (D). The facts that the estimates with the saving rate denition in Table 7 are very
much in line with those in previous tables and that the estimates in Table A5 in the Appendix
are much higher suggest that not accounting for the outlier values of the saving rate variable
overestimates the e¤ect.
Next, we check the robustness of our ndings in Table 2 to the outlier values of the savings
variable given the nding on the sensitivity of the results to the outlier values of the saving
rate variable discussed in the previous paragraph. Here, we use the adjusted savings based on
the minimum consumption approach outlined earlier, which ensures that savings do not exceed
household income. The estimation results given in Table A6 in the Appendix show that the
results in Table 2 are not sensitive to the exclusion of the outlier values of savings unlike the
case for the saving rate variable. This nding is perhaps not a surprise as the savings variable
enters in logarithmic form to the regression.
Missing Observations
In another robustness check, we examine whether the missing observations in our dependent
variables cause a bias. Across the observations for which the key macro-level variables are
available, the savings amount is missing in 12.2 percent, the saving decision is missing in 10.8
percent, and the return intention is missing in 18 percent. For this reason, we check whether
the missing status of these variables are related to our key variables of interest. The estimation
results of regressing the missing status of these variables on the key variables of interest in
addition to the full set of controls in Table 2, given in Table A7 in the Appendix, show that
the missing status of these variables do not depend on the key variables of interest.
Alternative Estimation Methods
In a nal robustness check, we use two alternative estimation methods: the standard Tobit
random e¤ects model and a Tobit model with the Mundlak approach, which estimates a Tobit
random-e¤ects model with group-means of independent variables. The Mundlak approach rst
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species an auxiliary distribution of the unobserved individual-e¤ects using the within means
of time-variant characteristics. It then estimates a random-e¤ects Tobit model conditional
on this auxiliary distribution of heterogeneity. The time-invariant characteristics we use in
the auxiliary distribution are household income and household size (both in logarithmic form),
employment status of the household head, the number of employed individuals in the household,
and dummies for married, child abroad, spouse abroad, and German spouse with reference to the
household head. The results from the Tobit random e¤ects model and the Mundlak approach
are presented in Tables A8 and A9, respectively.
The estimates with the alternative estimation methods conrm our ndings. In fact, both
the coe¢ cient estimates and their statistical signicance are higher with these alternative meth-
ods. The estimates with the Mundlak approach lie in between the estimates with the Tobit
random e¤ects and the Honore Tobit xed e¤ects estimates, but are closer to the Tobit random
e¤ects estimates. Our nding that the xed-e¤ects estimates are smaller in magnitude and
statistical signicance is similar to the ndings of Nguyen and Duncan (2017), who nd that
the e¤ect of PPP on immigrants labor market outcomes vanish once individual-level unob-
served heterogeneity is accounted for. Although our estimates also diminish with the use of
xed e¤ects, their statistical as well as economic signicance persists.
4.3.2 Potential E¤ects via Household Income
The e¤ects of our key variables of interest on savings could at least partially result from their
e¤ect on household income. In fact, Nekoei (2013) nds that immigrants in the US work fewer
hours and earn less when the dollar appreciates. Similarly, Nguyen and Duncan (2017) nd
that male immigrants in Australia work fewer hours when the local currency appreciates, but
not female immigrants. In this section, we examine whether household income responds to
our key variables of interest. The estimation results are given in Table 8, where the set of
control variables is the same as that in Table 2, except for household income (which is now the
dependent variable).
With specication (1), there is no evidence that our key variables of interest a¤ect household
income for any of the ve samples. When we allow the e¤ects of our key variables of interest to
vary by time to retirement with specication (2), there is once again no evidence for an e¤ect of
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these variables on household income with the full sample. However, as we restrict the sample by
return intentions, there emerges an e¤ect on household income at certain values of the number
of years to retirement. The exchange rate variable has a positive e¤ect on household income at
very low values of years to retirement and a negative e¤ect on household income at high values
of years to retirement with no evidence of an e¤ect at the median value. The e¤ect of the home
country price level is similar in terms of the pattern, but has the opposite direction.
Table 8 about here
We do not think that this evidence that our key variables of interest a¤ect household income
with specication (2) for certain samples is a serious issue with respect to the robustness of
our ndings. One reason is that the magnitude of the e¤ect of the key variables of interest on
household income is trivial compared to their e¤ect on savings. With sample (E), for example,
the elasticity of household income with respect to the exchange rate just before retirement is
0.167 compared to the elasticity of savings with the respect the nominal exchange rate just
before retirement, which is 6.25, as can be seen in Table 2. Second, as shown previously in
Table 4, when we exclude the set of individual-level covariates, including household income,
our ndings on the e¤ect of the key variables of interest still hold. In fact, with this exclusion,
the coe¢ cient estimates are very similar and only the standard errors are somewhat higher, as
expected. Third, even if a tiny part of the e¤ect of the key variables on savings come through
their e¤ect on household income, we have shown in Table 7 that the key variables of interest
have signicant e¤ects on the saving rate.
4.3.3 Potential Sample Selection due to Panel Attrition
A common problem in studies investigating the causal links between PPP and immigrants
behavior is sample selection due to return migration and panel attrition. This problem is
less acute with panel data than with cross-section data because time-invariant unobserved
characteristics that explain return migration are eliminated. Nonetheless, even with panel
data, if attrition is correlated with the shocks to our key variables of interest, our estimates
would be biased. To see a possible direction of the bias, suppose that a positive shock to PPP
induces an immigrant, whose saving behavior is highly sensitive to a PPP shock, to return to
her home country. If this immigrant were to remain in Germany, her response would contribute
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to a larger estimated value of the coe¢ cient measuring the e¤ect of PPP on saving. Thus in
this case, we would be underestimating the e¤ect of PPP on saving behavior.
In this section, we investigate how relevant this concern is in our context by checking
whether panel attrition for any reason is correlated with the key variables of interest. We dene
a dummy variable for panel attrition, which takes the value of zero for all years an individual is
in the sample and the value of one for the rst year he/she is not in the sample, and estimate
equation (27) with this dummy as the dependent variable. The results of this estimation are
given in Table A10 in the Appendix. Across all ve samples, there is only evidence with the
full sample that the nominal exchange rate a¤ects attrition, and this evidence is only at the
10-percent statistical signicance level. There is no evidence for any sample that source country
prices or PPP a¤ects attrition.
Another approach we take to assess if there is nonrandom panel attrition, we redo our
main estimation in Table 2 with restrictions on duration of residence. Tables A11 to A13 in
the Appendix show the estimation results where the sample is restricted using upper limits on
duration of residence that are 25 years, 20 years, and 15 years, respectively. We cannot place
further restrictions as the sample size becomes too small.26 The estimates with 25 years of
residence restriction, given in Table A11, are very similar to those in Table 2 both in terms
of statistical signicance and coe¢ cient magnitudes. With 20 years and 15 years of residence
restrictions, given in Tables A12 and A13 respectively, the general patterns hold, although the
statistical signicance is lower due to the lower sample size.
These ndings indicate that sample selection due to panel attrition is not a serious concern
in our setting. At rst, this may look contradictory to the previous studies establishing a causal
link between PPP and return realizations as well as intentions of immigrants in the same context
(K¬rdar, 2009, 2013). However, a signicant fraction of attrition from the sample occurs for
reasons other than return migration; and, once we take all reasons for attrition together, there
remains no evidence of a link between our key variables of interest and attrition.
26In the full sample, 74 percent of the observations have 25 or fewer years of residence, 61 percent have 20 or
fewer years of residence, and 47 percent have 15 or fewer years of residence.
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4.3.4 Heterogeneity
The above estimated e¤ects of the key variables of interest on saving behavior reect an "av-
erage e¤ect" for a heterogenous group of migrants. The response of migrants, however, might
di¤er signicantly with respect to their individual-level and country-level characteristics. For
instance, migrants with stronger ties to their home country might respond more. We now turn
our attention to the heterogeneity in our baseline estimates in terms of certain home country-
level and individual-level covariates by generating a binary variable for each covariate using an
appropriate threshold as described below. Due to the relatively small sample size, we prefer
using interaction models, rather than splitting the sample based on the dummy variable and
running separate regressions for either value of the dummy variable. Specically, we use the
following model,
si;t = 0 + 1di;t + '1di;t  eri;t 1 + '2(1  di;t)  eri;t 1 (29)
+1di;t p
H
i;t 1 + 2(1  di;t)pHi;t 1 + x
0
it + t +  i + i;t;
where di;t denotes the dummy variable we generate using an appropriate threshold for each
characteristic. The heterogeneity in the exchange rate variable with respect to di;t is measured
by the parameters '1 and '2, and the heterogeneity in the source-country price variable is
measured by the parameters 1 and 2. The remaining symbols used in equation (29) are
dened as in equation (27).
The results are presented in Figure 2, for the exchange rate variable in column (1) and for
the source-country price level variable in column (2). The gure presents the estimates of '1 and
1 with a circle (di;t = 1) and the estimates of '2 and 2 are shown with a triangle (di;t = 0). The
vertical lines passing through zero are presented to show statistical signicance and the dashed
lines around the parameter estimates are 90% condence intervals. In a separate specication,
we estimate the heterogeneity in the e¤ect of PPP using the same interaction model as above.
The results are given in the nal column of Figure 2.
Figure 2 presents several distinct patterns for the country-level characteristics in the upper
panel and for the individual-level characteristics in the lower panel. An increase in the exchange
rate (in the source-country price level) implies a larger (smaller) e¤ect on savings among the
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low-PPP countries (PPP<1.5). A similar result is obtained for richer home-countries (where
GDP per capita is higher than the 75th percentile value at $11,127). On the other hand, the
heterogeneity in the e¤ects of our key variables with respect to the conict status is much
smaller. These results are all consistent with the descriptive statistics in Table A1 of the Ap-
pendix, which shows that average PPP falls and average GDP per capita increases substantially
as return intentions get stronger.27 On the other hand, the proportional change in the average
conict index from sample (A) to sample (E) is smaller.
The geographic proximity of the source country to Germany might also a¤ect the saving
responses of immigrants. It can inuence return decisions via its e¤ect on migration costs as
well as the costs of remaining in contact with the community back home. However, we do not
nd any di¤erence between the distant source countries (whose distance to Germany is greater
than the median, 2111 km) and the proximate source countries in terms of the e¤ects of the
key variables of interest. Finally, we investigate whether the behavior of immigrants from the
guestworker countries (Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Spain) di¤ers from that of immigrants from
other source countries. Immigrants from guestworker countries are indeed more responsive to
changes in the exchange rate and in the source-country price level and this is perfectly consistent
with the di¤erences they exhibit in terms of their return intentions. While guestworkers indicate
an intention to return in 53.8 percent of the observations, other immigrants indicate an intention
to return only in 13.3 percent of the observations.
Heterogeneity in the e¤ects for individual-level characteristics is displayed in panel (B) of
Figure 2. The estimated e¤ects are larger for men than they are for women, which we would
expect, as men report an intention to return in 32 percent of the observations whereas women
report such an intention in 20 percent of the observations. The estimated e¤ects are larger
for older individuals (older than 55), which is consistent with Proposition 2. The only other
variables for which there is substantial heterogeneity are house-ownership status in Germany
and spouse living abroad. Certainly, owning a house in Germany is intimately linked to an
intention to stay and so the estimated e¤ects are smaller. By contrast, a spouse living abroad
implies a stronger intention to return and so the estimated e¤ects are larger in magnitude.
27In fact, the average PPP decreases from 2.42 in sample (A) to 1.95 in sample (E) and the average GDP per
capita increases from $12,458 to $17,125 from sample (A) to sample (E).
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Figure 2 about here
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we examine how the saving behavior of temporary migrants responds to unantici-
pated changes in the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) relationship. We do so by rst construct-
ing a theoretical model that focuses on the optimal saving and return decisions of temporary
migrants and subsequently test the model by using the data from the German Socio-economic
Panel (GSOEP) for the period 1992-2013.
Within the theoretical model, we distinguish between two cases: a) an interior solution,
whereby a migrant returns to the source country prior to the age of retirement, with the
intention of continuing to participate in the labor market after return and b) a corner solution,
in which case a migrant returns at the age of retirement only for the purpose of enjoying a
more favorable environment for consumption in the home country. When an interior solution
is optimal, an unanticipated increase in the price level of the source country lowers the optimal
saving rate abroad for the remainder of the stay, while an appreciation of foreign in terms of
source-country currency has an ambiguous e¤ect on the saving rate. The precise timing of the
shock to PPP, however, is found not to a¤ect the saving rate but only the optimal duration
of stay abroad. By contrast, when the economic conditions facing a migrant abroad and at
home imply that a corner solution is optimal, an unanticipated increase in the value of foreign
in terms of domestic currency or the price level abroad triggers an increase in the saving rate,
while an increase in the home price level has the opposite e¤ect. Our model also implies that
any given increase in PPP should result in an increase in the saving rate of the same magnitude,
regardless of whether the change in PPP stems from a change in the exchange rate or one of
the price levels. Moreover, the sensitivity of the saving rate to unanticipated changes in the
price level and the exchange rate is found to increase as the timing of the shock gets closer to
a migrants expected return (i.e., retirement) date.
This second case, in which migrants return to the source country at the age of retirement,
turns out to be the empirically more relevant one for migrants sampled in the GSOEP over the
1992-2013 period. The focus of our empirical investigation is therefore on testing the predictions
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related to the corner solution of our model. The GSOEP dataset is particularly suited for our
empirical analysis because it (i) contains information on migrantssavings in the host country,
(ii) oversamples immigrant households, and (iii) contains information on return intentions.
The data provide strong evidence that savings increase in the exchange rate and decrease in
the source-country price level. Also in line with the theoretical predictions, the positive e¤ect
of the exchange rate and the negative e¤ect of the source-country price level both decrease as
years to retirement increase. Furthermore, these relationships become stronger for immigrants
with stronger return intentions.
Quantitatively, the elasticity of savings with respect to the exchange rate is 0.83 for the full
sample. It increases to 1.64 for the sample of individuals who indicate an intention to return
to the home country in at least one year in the data and to 2.6 for the sample of individuals
who indicate a return intention at least 60 percent of the time. The elasticity with respect to
the source-country price level is similar in magnitude but has the opposite sign. At the median
level of years to retirement (around 17), the absolute values of the elasticity of savings with
respect to the exchange rate and with respect to the source-country price level are both close to
unity with the full sample. Just before retirement, however, the absolute value of the elasticity
of savings is 1.75 with respect to the exchange rate and 1.89 with respect to the source-country
price level.
At a more general level, this theoretical and empirical analysis of the saving behavior of
temporary migrants helps contribute to our understanding of the role of international migra-
tion in the development process. In a very large number of developing countries, temporary
employment abroad is a dominant mode of international migration. Temporariness in itself
has important, yet subtle implications for economic behavior in a dynamic context. This is
especially so with respect to savings accumulation, since both foreign and domestic economic
conditions are at play. Our interest in understanding how the exchange rate and the home-
country price level a¤ect migrantssavings is based on two important observations: (a) these
key price variables tend to be highly volatile in developing countries and (b) diaspora savings
can be of substantial magnitude in relation to aggregate savings in countries of emigration.
Thus the factors that drive the saving behavior of temporary migrants can potentially play a
fundamental role in the development process of countries of emigration.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean St. Dev. Min Max Obs.
A) Individual-level Characteristics
A1) Cross-Section Characteristics
Year of Immigration 1991.90 13.36 1952 2013 2,966
Age at Arrival 30.16 8.80 18 63 2,966
Male 0.65 0.48 0 1 2,966
A2) Panel-Level Characteristics
Positive Savings 0.44 0.50 0 1 11,080
Average Monthly Savings (Euros) 244.75 525.59 0 12245.32 11,080
Adjusted Savings (using Min. Consumption) 227.47 443.14 0 4898.13 11,080
Saving Rate (using Adjusted Savings) 0.08 0.15 0 0.89 11,080
Intend to Return 0.29 0.46 0 1 10,186
Age 47.14 10.34 20 64 11,080
Years since migration 17.89 10.22 0 46 11,080
Years to retirement 17.86 10.34 1 45 11,080
Annual Household Income (Euros) 28366.75 13934.01 4613 84081 11,080
Household Size 3.25 1.55 1 13 11,080
Employed (Household head) 0.64 0.48 0 1 11,080
Number employed in household 1.30 1.02 0 6 11,080
Married 0.80 0.40 0 1 11,080
Spouse abroad 0.01 0.11 0 1 11,080
Child abroad 0.03 0.17 0 1 11,080
Partner German 0.08 0.27 0 1 11,080
B) Country-level Characteristics
Purchasing Power Parity 2.42 1.18 0.99 10.58 11,080
Exchange Rate 246.00 1758.70 0.00 28509.52 11,080
Price in Home Country 7746.58 56279.36 0.00 966545.60 11,080
Price in Germany 88.95 9.98 70.19 104.13 11,080
Gross Domestic Product 12458.54 9781.59 186.92 38239.06 11,080
Country Conflict Index 0.76 1.36 0 7 11,080
Notes: The sample includes immigrant household heads who arrived in Germany after age 18 in the 1992-2013 waves of the German
Socioeconomic Panel. The set of origin countries of immigrants is restricted to those where ppp with Germany averages above 1 in the
1991-2012 period and where the average GDP per capita in the 1991-2012 period is lower than that in Germany. Origin countries for
which key macro-variables are not available for any year in the 1991-2012 period are also excluded (most notably ex-Yugoslavia). The
panel format is restricted to observations in which individuals are under the age of 65.
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Figure 1: Raw Relationships: Savings, Exchange Rate, Home Country Prices, and Purchasing Power Parity 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the raw relationships between monthly savings and the key variables of interest - exchange rates, home country prices, 
and purchasing power parity - conditional on time and country fixed-effects. The figure in each panel is drawn by using the mean predicted 
monthly savings over 20 equal-sized bins of predicted exchange rates, home country prices, and purchasing power parity, respectively. OLS lines 
are drawn using the raw data. 
 
 
Table 2: Tests of Propositions I and II by Return Intentions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Exchange Rate 0.827* 1.757** 1.641** 2.560** 2.133** 3.302** 2.604** 5.274*** 2.748** 6.250***
[0.448] [0.747] [0.739] [1.176] [0.869] [1.345] [1.060] [1.673] [1.357] [2.027]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.049 -0.046 -0.072 -0.186** -0.232**
[0.030] [0.052] [0.059] [0.083] [0.096]
Log Home C. Price -0.790* -1.889** -1.723** -2.571** -2.196*** -3.537*** -2.588** -5.557*** -2.703** -6.652***
[0.430] [0.767] [0.719] [1.208] [0.842] [1.373] [1.031] [1.680] [1.319] [2.013]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.055* 0.040 0.077 0.190** 0.241***
[0.031] [0.052] [0.059] [0.081] [0.093]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.530*** -0.200 -0.033 -0.059 -0.024
[0.169] [0.226] [0.265] [0.313] [0.312]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2966 2966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Log PPP 0.759* 1.028 1.851** 2.194* 2.280*** 3.297** 2.564** 5.171*** 2.639** 6.315***
[0.430] [0.755] [0.722] [1.179] [0.836] [1.334] [1.033] [1.565] [1.317] [1.921]
Log PPP * YTR -0.013 -0.016 -0.052 -0.146** -0.199**
[0.029] [0.048] [0.054] [0.068] [0.082]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2966 2966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Dependent Variable: Log Savings
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
(Sample E)
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column
headings. PPP stands for purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. Honore Tobit Fixed Effects regressions are used. In addition to the key variables of interest,
the specifications include time dummies, additional source-country level covariates, and several individual-level covarites. Source-country level covariates other than the key variables
of interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. Individual-level covariates include log household income, log household size, employment of household
head, number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head -- in addition to
dummies for years since migration. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
(Sample A)
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
(Sample B)
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
(Sample C)
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
(Sample D)
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Table 3: Joint E¤ects of Exchange Rate Variables and of Home Country Price Variables in
Even-Numbered Columns in Table 2
YTR Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
0 1.757 0.747 ** 2.560 1.176 ** 3.302 1.345 ** 5.274 1.673 *** 6.250 2.027 ***
5 1.510 0.633 ** 2.328 0.982 ** 2.940 1.138 ** 4.346 1.381 *** 5.092 1.696 ***
10 1.262 0.537 ** 2.097 0.826 ** 2.578 0.977 *** 3.418 1.165 *** 3.935 1.451 ***
15 1.015 0.470 ** 1.865 0.733 ** 2.216 0.888 ** 2.489 1.073 ** 2.777 1.340 **
20 0.768 0.447 * 1.633 0.727 ** 1.854 0.892 ** 1.561 1.136 1.619 1.396
25 0.520 0.473 1.402 0.810 * 1.492 0.989 0.633 1.331 0.462 1.601
30 0.273 0.542 1.170 0.959 1.130 1.154 -0.295 1.612 -0.696 1.909
35 0.026 0.640 0.938 1.150 0.768 1.364 -1.223 1.942 -1.853 2.277
40 -0.222 0.755 0.707 1.363 0.406 1.601 -2.151 2.299 -3.011 2.681
YTR Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
0 -1.889 0.767 ** -2.571 1.208 ** -3.537 1.373 ** -5.557 1.680 *** -6.652 2.013 ***
5 -1.615 0.644 ** -2.370 1.006 ** -3.154 1.154 *** -4.609 1.381 *** -5.448 1.681 ***
10 -1.341 0.538 ** -2.168 0.837 ** -2.770 0.978 *** -3.661 1.149 *** -4.244 1.425 ***
15 -1.066 0.461 ** -1.966 0.725 *** -2.386 0.868 *** -2.712 1.032 *** -3.040 1.293 **
20 -0.792 0.430 * -1.764 0.699 ** -2.002 0.852 ** -1.764 1.068 * -1.836 1.321
25 -0.518 0.453 -1.563 0.766 ** -1.618 0.935 * -0.816 1.243 -0.632 1.501
30 -0.244 0.525 -1.361 0.906 -1.234 1.094 0.132 1.510 0.571 1.788
35 0.030 0.628 -1.159 1.092 -0.850 1.302 1.080 1.829 1.775 2.139
40 0.304 0.749 -0.957 1.304 -0.466 1.539 2.028 2.178 2.979 2.527
A) Log Exchange Rate
B) Log Home Country Price Level
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors give the joint estimates -- based on the estimates in even-numbered columns of Table 2 where the dependent variable is log
savings -- of the exchange rate variable and its interaction with years to retirement in panel (A) and of the home country price variable and its interaction with years to
migration in panel (B) at selected values of years to retirement given in row headings. YTR stands for years to retirement. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent
level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
(Sample A)
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
(Sample C)
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
(Sample D)
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
(Sample E)
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
(Sample B)
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Table 4: Robustness Check I-A Shorter Lists of Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Exchange Rate 0.712 2.067** 1.414* 3.857*** 1.815** 4.441*** 2.507** 5.744*** 2.471* 6.462***
[0.492] [0.877] [0.831] [1.335] [0.897] [1.495] [1.037] [1.751] [1.430] [2.245]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.067* -0.124** -0.159** -0.223*** -0.269**
[0.035] [0.059] [0.069] [0.086] [0.108]
Log Home C. Price -0.766 -2.294** -1.601** -3.990*** -2.048** -4.868*** -2.686*** -6.243*** -2.644* -7.194***
[0.475] [0.909] [0.800] [1.391] [0.861] [1.543] [0.994] [1.773] [1.366] [2.230]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.073** 0.116* 0.162** 0.229*** 0.284***
[0.037] [0.061] [0.070] [0.085] [0.104]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR 0.038 0.413 0.614** 0.511* 0.500
[0.181] [0.251] [0.266] [0.310] [0.316]
Observations 11,453 11,453 5,586 5,586 4,760 4,760 3,856 3,856 2,888 2,888
No. of households 3021 3021 1022 1022 948 948 849 849 740 740
Log Exchange Rate 0.772 1.899** 1.846** 3.852*** 2.213** 4.337*** 2.725** 5.721*** 2.571* 6.366***
[0.523] [0.880] [0.900] [1.333] [0.964] [1.454] [1.128] [1.763] [1.457] [2.217]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.062* -0.117* -0.149** -0.227** -0.268**
[0.037] [0.063] [0.070] [0.094] [0.112]
Log Home C. Price -0.774 -2.080** -2.023** -3.995*** -2.369** -4.709*** -2.856*** -6.193*** -2.696* -7.077***
[0.502] [0.914] [0.875] [1.387] [0.934] [1.500] [1.092] [1.786] [1.411] [2.198]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.067* 0.110* 0.152** 0.233** 0.284***
[0.038] [0.064] [0.070] [0.092] [0.107]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR 0.053 0.409 0.612** 0.501 0.489
[0.182] [0.251] [0.265] [0.310] [0.317]
Observations 11,419 11,419 5,574 5,574 4,748 4,748 3,848 3,848 2,880 2,880
No. of households 3014 3014 1019 1019 945 945 847 847 738 738
Log Exchange Rate 0.770* 1.877** 1.292* 2.512** 1.895** 3.291** 2.475** 5.173*** 2.412* 6.367***
[0.424] [0.747] [0.680] [1.173] [0.802] [1.362] [0.991] [1.642] [1.344] [2.035]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.054* -0.055 -0.077 -0.170** -0.242***
[0.030] [0.049] [0.057] [0.073] [0.088]
Log Home C. Price -0.771* -2.046*** -1.348** -2.485** -1.998*** -3.563** -2.486*** -5.488*** -2.395* -6.792***
[0.412] [0.767] [0.658] [1.203] [0.772] [1.389] [0.951] [1.642] [1.287] [2.016]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.059* 0.048 0.081 0.175** 0.250***
[0.031] [0.050] [0.058] [0.073] [0.086]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.540*** -0.193 -0.029 -0.055 -0.020
[0.169] [0.226] [0.266] [0.312] [0.312]
Observations 11,114 11,114 5,412 5,412 4,597 4,597 3,723 3,723 2,779 2,779
No. of households 2973 2973 1001 1001 927 927 828 828 719 719
A) Control Variables: Time Dummies, Duration of Residence Dummies
B) Controls in (A) + Country-level Covariates other than the Key Variables of Interest
C) Controls in (A) + Full List of Individual-level Covariates
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column
headings. YTR stands for years till retirement. Honore Tobit Fixed Effects regressions are used. Source-country level covariates other than the key variables of interest include the
logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. The full list of individual-level covariates include log household income, log household size, employment of household head,
number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head -- in addition to
dummies for years since migration. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Dependent Variable: Log Savings
Full Sample
(Sample A)
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
(Sample B)
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
(Sample C)
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
(Sample D)
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
(Sample E)
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Table 5: Robustness Check I-B Country-Specic Time Trends as Additional Control
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Exchange Rate 0.554 0.032 1.215 1.174 1.719* 2.426 1.747 4.777*** 1.805 6.163***
[0.487] [0.815] [0.779] [1.427] [1.016] [1.601] [1.225] [1.849] [1.558] [2.324]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR 0.024 -0.000 -0.044 -0.211** -0.290***
[0.035] [0.065] [0.074] [0.099] [0.107]
Log Home C. Price -0.674 -0.697 -1.397* -1.540 -2.000** -2.913* -2.517** -5.701*** -2.750* -7.259***
[0.486] [0.809] [0.774] [1.340] [0.984] [1.551] [1.172] [1.764] [1.508] [2.215]
Log Home C. Price * YTR -0.001 0.006 0.052 0.215** 0.293***
[0.035] [0.060] [0.069] [0.092] [0.100]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.599*** -0.374 -0.290 -0.328 -0.185
[0.181] [0.259] [0.295] [0.327] [0.349]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 3192 3192 1066 1066 992 992 892 892 782 782
Log PPP 0.631 -0.286 1.320* 1.474 1.910* 2.889* 2.257* 5.335*** 2.299 6.559***
[0.476] [0.778] [0.756] [1.302] [0.975] [1.500] [1.163] [1.753] [1.509] [2.177]
Log PPP * YTR 0.051 -0.009 -0.056 -0.213** -0.281***
[0.033] [0.059] [0.066] [0.091] [0.105]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 3192 3192 1066 1066 992 992 892 892 782 782
Dependent Variable: Log Savings
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column
headings. PPP stands for purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. Honore Tobit Fixed Effects regressions are used. In addition to the key variables of interest,
the specifications include country-specific time trends, additional source-country level covariates, and several individual-level covarites. Source-country level covariates other than the
key variables of interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. Individual-level covariates include log household income, log household size, employment
of household head, number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head --
in addition to dummies for years since migration. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
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Table 6: Robustness Check II-A Dummy Variable for Positive Savings as the Dependent
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Exchange Rate 0.076*** 0.134** 0.169*** 0.236*** 0.212*** 0.331*** 0.249*** 0.456*** 0.230*** 0.513***
[0.025] [0.051] [0.053] [0.070] [0.054] [0.097] [0.063] [0.123] [0.076] [0.129]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.003 -0.003 -0.008** -0.015*** -0.020***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Log Home C. Price -0.059** -0.128** -0.156*** -0.210*** -0.199*** -0.323*** -0.234*** -0.457*** -0.213*** -0.515***
[0.027] [0.058] [0.049] [0.068] [0.049] [0.097] [0.062] [0.125] [0.078] [0.136]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.004 0.003 0.008** 0.015*** 0.020***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.034* 0.002 0.026* 0.020 0.025
[0.019] [0.014] [0.015] [0.020] [0.017]
Observations 11,244 11,244 5,488 5,488 4,661 4,661 3,783 3,783 2,827 2,827
No. of households 0.048 0.049 0.064 0.065 0.079 0.081 0.077 0.080 0.086 0.092
Log PPP 0.045 0.095 0.136*** 0.223*** 0.181*** 0.347*** 0.212*** 0.467*** 0.186** 0.512***
[0.030] [0.062] [0.048] [0.079] [0.049] [0.100] [0.067] [0.112] [0.090] [0.119]
Log PPP * YTR -0.002 -0.004 -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.018***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Observations 11,244 11,244 5,488 5,488 4,661 4,661 3,783 3,783 2,827 2,827
No. of households 0.047 0.048 0.064 0.064 0.079 0.080 0.076 0.079 0.086 0.090
Dependent Variable: Dummy Variable for Positive Savings
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads who arrived in Germany after age 18 in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column
headings. PPP stands for purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. OLS Fixed Effects regressions are used. In addition to the key variables of interest, the
specifications include time dummies, additional source-country level covariates, and several individual-level covarites. Source-country level covariates other than the key variables of
interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. Individual-level covariates include log household income, log household size, employment of household
head, number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head -- in addition to
years since migration in 5-year intervals. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
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Table 7: Robustness Check II-B Saving Rate (Dened Using Minimum Consumption
Needs) as the Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Exchange Rate 0.056* 0.155*** 0.141** 0.271*** 0.132* 0.273*** 0.140 0.335*** 0.186 0.414**
[0.032] [0.053] [0.060] [0.090] [0.072] [0.102] [0.088] [0.130] [0.119] [0.170]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.005** -0.007* -0.008** -0.013** -0.015**
[0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007]
Log Home C. Price -0.054* -0.158*** -0.143** -0.269*** -0.136** -0.280*** -0.139* -0.345*** -0.186 -0.432***
[0.031] [0.054] [0.058] [0.091] [0.069] [0.102] [0.083] [0.129] [0.113] [0.166]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.005** 0.007* 0.008** 0.013** 0.015**
[0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.023** -0.011 -0.005 -0.009 -0.004
[0.011] [0.016] [0.018] [0.020] [0.022]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2966 2966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Log PPP 0.052* 0.129** 0.145** 0.244*** 0.140** 0.245** 0.137* 0.300** 0.185* 0.376**
[0.030] [0.052] [0.056] [0.091] [0.067] [0.103] [0.081] [0.125] [0.110] [0.165]
Log PPP * YTR -0.004* -0.005 -0.006 -0.009* -0.011*
[0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2966 2966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Dependent Variable: Saving Rate (Defined Using Minimum Consumption Needs)
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column
headings. PPP stands for purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. Honore Tobit Fixed Effects regressions are used. In defining the saving rate, if monthly savings
are higher than the difference between the monthly household income and the monthly minimum consumption needs of household (calculated according to the rules of German social
assistance welfare program), monthly savings are replaced by the latter variable. In addition to the key variables of interest, the specifications include time dummies, additional source-
country level covariates, and several individual-level covarites. Source-country level covariates other than the key variables of interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a
political conflict index. Individual-level covariates include log household income, log household size, employment of household head, number of employed individuals in the household,
and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head -- in addition to years since migration in 5-year intervals. Top 1 and
bottom 1 percentiles of household income are dropped. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
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Table 8: E¤ects of Key Variables of Interest on Household Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Exchange Rate -0.007 0.050 -0.051 0.046 -0.039 0.124 -0.019 0.082 -0.023 0.167*
[0.026] [0.034] [0.034] [0.064] [0.043] [0.077] [0.043] [0.065] [0.050] [0.085]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.003 -0.006* -0.010*** -0.007** -0.013***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Log Home C. Price 0.000 -0.047 0.038 -0.047 0.028 -0.120 0.006 -0.087 0.010 -0.183**
[0.023] [0.037] [0.033] [0.064] [0.042] [0.075] [0.043] [0.058] [0.052] [0.081]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.002 0.005 0.009*** 0.007** 0.013***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.048*** 0.040*** 0.049***
[0.013] [0.010] [0.008] [0.011] [0.012]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 0.416 0.420 0.455 0.458 0.461 0.467 0.440 0.444 0.464 0.474
Log PPP 0.005 0.098** -0.017 0.043 -0.011 0.106 0.012 0.062 0.010 0.146*
[0.021] [0.046] [0.037] [0.065] [0.045] [0.084] [0.046] [0.057] [0.062] [0.075]
Log PPP * YTR -0.005** -0.003 -0.006** -0.003 -0.008***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 0.416 0.417 0.455 0.455 0.460 0.461 0.440 0.440 0.464 0.465
Dependent Variable: Log Household Income
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads who arrived in Germany after age 18 in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column
headings. PPP stands for purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. OLS Fixed Effects regressions are used. In addition to the key variables of interest, the
specifications include time dummies, additional source-country level covariates, and several individual-level covarites. Source-country level covariates other than the key variables of
interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. Individual-level covariates include log household size, employment of household head, number of employed
individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head -- in addition to dummies for years since
migration groups. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
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Figure 2: Heterogeneity Analysis by Selected Country-level and Individual-level Characteristics 
 
Notes: Results are obtained using the interaction model in equation (29), where we investigate the heterogeneity in the effects of exchange rate, home country 
prices, and purchasing power parity on monthly savings over various individual- and country-level characteristics. We define a binary variable, d, for each 
characteristic of interest (The specific definition for each d is given in the parentheses above). Circles represent the estimated coefficient when d is equal to one 
and triangles represent the coefficients when d is equal to zero. Solid and dashed lines around the estimated coefficients represent the 90% confidence intervals. 
The vertical lines are located at zero to identify the statistical significance of coefficients at the 10% level. In the panel for country-level characteristics, a country 
belongs to the high income group if its income is above the 75th percentile, to the high conflict group if its conflict index is above the 75th percentile, and to the 
high distance group if its distance to Germany is above the median. In the panel for individual-level characteristics, a person belongs to the low income group if 
her income lies below the 25th percentile of this variable.  
A Appendix A
A.1 Alternative Specication: All Savings Continuously Remitted
to the Source Country in the form of Domestic Currency
If all savings out of earnings abroad are immediately converted into domestic currency and
remitted back to the source country, then assuming again that the change in PPP is due to a
change in e; p or p at t = , a migrants optimal consumption rate abroad from time  to T
satises the following budget constraint.
e0[A

0 + (w
   p0c0)] + (T   )e1(w   p1c1) +R[Te1w   1=1 p1c1] = 0; (30)
where we assume, as before, that pension income is received from abroad in the form of foreign
currency. We then have
p1c

1 =
e0
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[A0 + 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   p0c0)] + [T   +RT ]w
[T   +R1= 11 ]
: (31)
The impact of a change in any of the components of PPP on c1 can be seen by di¤erentiating
eq. (31) with respect to each of the variables.
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Comparing Eq. (21) with (32), we see that the last terms are identical, while the rst term
in (32) is unambiguously negative. The elasticity of consumption with respect to the exchange
rate in the setting where all assets are continuously remitted back home and held in the form of
domestic currency is therefore algebraically smaller than if assets are accumulated in the form of
foreign currency. But why should consumption abroad decline by more when the migrant holds
his savings in the form of domestic rather than foreign currency? By holding domestic currency,
he experiences a capital loss on his savings, when measured in terms of foreign currency, as a
result of an increase in e. This calls for a relatively greater reduction in consumption abroad
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in order to generate the savings needed to meet his optimal consumption program after return.
Thus the qualitative impact of an increase in the exchange rate on pc is the same, regardless
of whether the migrant remits savings continuously to the source country and holds them in the
form of domestic currency, as we assume here, or holds savings in the form of foreign currency
over the entire planning horizon, as we assumed earlier. This is important from the perspective
of our study as we do not address the problem of what determines whether and what fraction
of savings a migrant chooses to hold in the form of domestic currency. Eqs. (33) and (34) are,
on the other hand, exactly identical to (22) and (23), respectively.
The e¤ect of YSM on (32)  (34) is also identical to (24)  (26). Since the last two
expressions, respectively, are the same, only the e¤ect of  on the elasticity with respect to the
exchange rate deserves a further comment. As the last terms in (21) and (32) are identical, we
need to consider only the e¤ect of  on the rst term in (32). This is given by
  d
d
(
1
T   +R1= 11
)
=   1h
T   +R1= 11
i2 < 0: (35)
Since (24) is negative (for  < 1), which is also the same as the e¤ect of YSM on the last term
in (32), we can conclude that the overall e¤ect of YSM on (32) is unambiguously negative. These
are qualitatively the same results we obtained earlier under the assumption that a migrants
savings are held in the form of foreign currency.
A.2 Appendix to Section 2
The optimal return date after a PPP shock becomes
 =
e1(p

0c

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 = 1  (T  R)e1w
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The expression for  is unambiguously positive if R=T >  and of ambiguous sign otherwise.
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B Appendix B: Tables and Figures in Appendix
Figure A1: Age Distribution at the Intended Time of Return
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Figure A2: PPP of Selected Countries with Germany
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Figure A3: Log Exchange Rate of Selected Countries with Germany
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Figure A4: Log Price Level in Selected Source Countries
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics by Return Intentions
Full Sample
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
Return Intention
more than 20%
of the Time
Return Intention
more than 40%
of the Time
Return Intention
more than 60%
of the Time
A) Individual-level Characteristics
A1) Cross-Section Characteristics
Year of Immigration 1991.90 1984.10 1984.57 1985.53 1987.22
Age at Arrival 30.16 27.77 27.78 28.00 28.13
Male 0.65 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.72
A2) Panel-Level Characteristics
Positive Savings 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.44
Average Monthly Savings (Euros) 244.75 292.08 298.68 306.14 331.68
Adjusted Savings (using Min. Consumption) 227.47 263.82 270.30 273.66 296.48
Saving Rate (using Adjusted Savings) 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11
Intend to Return 0.29 0.57 0.65 0.75 0.85
Age 47.14 49.18 49.37 49.70 49.27
Years since migration 17.89 22.68 23.07 23.11 22.44
Years to retirement 17.86 15.82 15.63 15.30 15.73
Annual Household Income (Euros) 28366.75 28208.53 28118.76 28048.36 28392.91
Household Size 3.25 3.29 3.27 3.23 3.15
Employed (Household head) 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.61
Number employed in household 1.30 1.43 1.45 1.43 1.38
Married 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Spouse abroad 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Child abroad 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
Partner German 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.07
B) Country-level Characteristics
Purchasing Power Parity 2.42 2.06 2.01 1.99 1.95
Exchange Rate 246.00 176.27 133.94 159.67 83.81
Price in Home Country 7746.58 5318.64 4047.68 4742.92 2931.40
Price in Germany 88.95 85.15 84.87 84.92 85.14
Gross Domestic Product 12458.54 16248.33 16828.22 17113.97 17125.61
Country Conflict Index 0.76 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.90
Notes: The sample includes immigrant household heads who arrived in Germany after age 18 in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel. The
set of origin countries of immigrants is restricted to those where ppp with Germany averages above 1 in the 1991-2012 period and where the average GDP per
capita in the 1991-2012 period is lower than that in Germany. Origin countries for which key macro-variables are not available for any year in the 1991-2012
period are also excluded (most notably ex-Yugoslavia). The panel format is restricted to observations in which individuals are under the age of 65.
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Table A2: E¤ects of Other Control Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Household Income 3.207*** 3.257*** 3.129*** 3.139*** 3.167*** 3.116*** 3.132*** 3.050*** 3.156*** 2.976***
[0.246] [0.247] [0.344] [0.348] [0.377] [0.383] [0.455] [0.457] [0.543] [0.543]
Log Household Size -0.928*** -0.805** -0.967** -0.921** -0.664 -0.779 -0.949* -1.215** -0.981 -1.468**
[0.329] [0.342] [0.422] [0.439] [0.481] [0.501] [0.529] [0.569] [0.608] [0.688]
Employed (H. Head) 0.757*** 0.918*** 0.875*** 0.950*** 0.937*** 0.832** 0.624 0.394 0.850* 0.478
[0.240] [0.245] [0.320] [0.334] [0.343] [0.355] [0.387] [0.393] [0.446] [0.455]
Number Employed 0.036 0.050 0.073 0.077 0.013 0.036 0.061 0.124 -0.003 0.120
[0.115] [0.115] [0.155] [0.158] [0.167] [0.170] [0.203] [0.208] [0.229] [0.237]
Married (H. Head) 0.268 0.208 -0.809 -0.814 -1.158** -1.137** -0.412 -0.278 -0.477 -0.142
[0.442] [0.420] [0.560] [0.553] [0.533] [0.536] [0.601] [0.547] [0.556] [0.531]
Spouse Abroad (H. Head) 0.208 -0.161 0.245 0.047 0.132 0.052 0.136 -0.044 0.248 0.087
[0.562] [0.416] [0.601] [0.513] [0.576] [0.610] [0.564] [0.598] [0.479] [0.549]
Child Abroad (H. Head) 0.865* 0.914* 0.530 0.556 0.582 0.604 0.517 0.559 0.433 0.520
[0.459] [0.467] [0.533] [0.542] [0.537] [0.540] [0.607] [0.606] [0.789] [0.802]
German Partner (H. Head) 0.072 0.208 1.208 1.235 1.807 1.796 -0.606 -0.756 -0.850 -1.062
[0.476] [0.481] [1.047] [1.052] [1.349] [1.342] [4.986] [4.976] [3.636] [3.647]
Log GDP per capita 0.480 0.132 0.904 0.297 0.638 0.055 0.601 -1.134 2.902 0.599
[0.821] [0.809] [1.125] [1.184] [1.749] [1.703] [1.981] [1.886] [2.247] [2.177]
Political Conflict Index 0.087 0.088 -0.127 -0.122 0.053 0.063 0.051 0.065 0.033 0.069
[0.075] [0.075] [0.132] [0.127] [0.174] [0.170] [0.218] [0.213] [0.236] [0.237]
Duration of Residence
7-9 years 0.461* 0.544** 1.451*** 1.505*** 1.741*** 1.504*** 1.889*** 1.346* 1.926** 1.120
[0.253] [0.260] [0.475] [0.514] [0.558] [0.579] [0.732] [0.705] [0.801] [0.770]
10-13 years 0.246 0.425 1.508** 1.633** 1.936** 1.549* 2.731*** 1.989** 2.926** 1.914*
[0.360] [0.365] [0.711] [0.776] [0.800] [0.862] [1.028] [1.012] [1.146] [1.100]
14-17 years 0.077 0.396 1.512 1.714* 1.969** 1.420 2.579** 1.532 2.523* 1.175
[0.495] [0.505] [0.925] [1.041] [0.992] [1.126] [1.265] [1.271] [1.345] [1.285]
18-21 years -0.103 0.321 0.868 1.136 1.242 0.555 1.781 0.464 2.119 0.382
[0.625] [0.638] [1.063] [1.207] [1.156] [1.325] [1.433] [1.493] [1.530] [1.522]
22-26 years -0.651 -0.172 0.555 0.838 1.085 0.390 1.495 0.142 1.723 -0.085
[0.740] [0.752] [1.203] [1.343] [1.303] [1.473] [1.560] [1.631] [1.686] [1.687]
27-31 years -0.936 -0.403 0.540 0.809 1.106 0.433 1.419 0.083 1.830 0.081
[0.882] [0.888] [1.363] [1.478] [1.489] [1.626] [1.739] [1.782] [1.925] [1.870]
32+ years -1.209 -0.770 0.575 0.786 1.220 0.587 1.588 0.352 2.049 0.490
[1.029] [1.032] [1.516] [1.597] [1.649] [1.747] [1.928] [1.928] [2.178] [2.066]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2966 2966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age format while they are
under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column headings. Honore Tobit Fixed Effects
regressions are used. In addition to the variables above, the specifications in the odd-numbered columns include log exchange rate and log home country price level whereas the specifications in the even-
numbered columns also include the interaction of these variables with years to retirement as well as the interaction of host country price level with years to retirement. All specifications also include time
dummies. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Dependent Variable: Log Savings
Return Intention more
than 60 Percent of the
Time (Sample E)
Full Sample
(Sample A)
Return Intention at
Least for One Year
(Sample B)
Return Intention more
than 20 Percent of the
Time (Sample C)
Return Intention more
than 40 Percent of the
Time (Sample D)
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Table A3: Robustness Check - E¤ects of Elements of PPP with Shorter Lists of Control
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log PPP 0.804* 2.359*** 2.048*** 3.818*** 2.725*** 4.878*** 3.246*** 5.990*** 3.261** 7.308***
[0.477] [0.852] [0.788] [1.342] [0.851] [1.510] [0.978] [1.669] [1.327] [2.087]
Log PPP * YTR -0.068** -0.076 -0.094 -0.127* -0.182**
[0.032] [0.054] [0.062] [0.071] [0.082]
Observations 11,453 11,453 5,586 5,586 4,760 4,760 3,856 3,856 2,888 2,888
No. of households 3021 3021 1022 1022 948 948 849 849 740 740
Log PPP 0.775 2.205*** 2.297*** 3.752*** 2.581*** 4.819*** 3.043*** 5.902*** 2.888** 7.024***
[0.503] [0.852] [0.852] [1.348] [0.928] [1.469] [1.079] [1.636] [1.390] [2.020]
Log PPP * YTR -0.067** -0.071 -0.117* -0.161** -0.224**
[0.033] [0.058] [0.064] [0.075] [0.087]
Observations 11,419 11,419 5,574 5,574 4,748 4,748 3,848 3,848 2,880 2,880
No. of households 3014 3014 1019 1019 945 945 847 847 738 738
Log PPP 0.772* 1.109 1.476** 2.202* 2.279*** 3.257** 2.521*** 5.161*** 2.338* 6.438***
[0.415] [0.754] [0.672] [1.181] [0.775] [1.351] [0.944] [1.580] [1.235] [1.932]
Log PPP * YTR -0.015 -0.031 -0.043 -0.124* -0.188**
[0.029] [0.046] [0.053] [0.064] [0.074]
Observations 11,114 11,114 5,412 5,412 4,597 4,597 3,723 3,723 2,779 2,779
No. of households 2973 2973 1001 1001 927 927 828 828 719 719
A) Control Variables: Time Dummies, Duration of Residence Dummies
B) Controls in (A) + Country-level Covariates other than the Key Variables of Interest
C) Controls in (A) + Full List of Individual-level Covariates
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column
headings. YTR stands for years till retirement. Honore Tobit Fixed Effects regressions are used. Source-country level covariates other than the key variables of interest include the
logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. The full list of individual-level covariates include log household income, log household size, employment of household head,
number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head -- in addition to
dummies for years since migration. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Dependent Variable: Log Savings
Full Sample
(Sample A)
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
(Sample B)
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
(Sample C)
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
(Sample D)
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
(Sample E)
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Table A4: Robustness Check Dummy Variable for Positive Savings as the Dependent
Variable when Sample is Restricted to That in Table 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Exchange Rate 0.080*** 0.150*** 0.176*** 0.265*** 0.218*** 0.354*** 0.256*** 0.475*** 0.232*** 0.532***
[0.027] [0.051] [0.056] [0.072] [0.055] [0.100] [0.063] [0.126] [0.078] [0.122]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.004* -0.005 -0.009** -0.016*** -0.021***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Log Home C. Price -0.065** -0.148** -0.164*** -0.244*** -0.206*** -0.348*** -0.242*** -0.480*** -0.214*** -0.536***
[0.029] [0.058] [0.051] [0.067] [0.048] [0.098] [0.060] [0.127] [0.078] [0.130]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.004* 0.004 0.009** 0.016*** 0.021***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.037** -0.001 0.021 0.014 0.019
[0.019] [0.014] [0.015] [0.020] [0.018]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 0.049 0.050 0.067 0.068 0.081 0.082 0.079 0.082 0.087 0.093
Log PPP 0.052 0.108* 0.145*** 0.253*** 0.188*** 0.369*** 0.221*** 0.488*** 0.188** 0.532***
[0.031] [0.063] [0.049] [0.077] [0.046] [0.102] [0.064] [0.114] [0.090] [0.114]
Log PPP * YTR -0.003 -0.005 -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.019***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 0.049 0.049 0.067 0.068 0.080 0.082 0.078 0.081 0.086 0.091
Dependent Variable: Dummy Variable for Positive Savings
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads who arrived in Germany after age 18 in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column
headings. PPP stands for purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. OLS Fixed Effects regressions are used. In addition to the key variables of interest, the
specifications include time dummies, additional source-country level covariates, and several individual-level covarites. Source-country level covariates other than the key variables of
interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. Individual-level covariates include log household income, log household size, employment of household
head, number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head -- in addition to
years since migration in 5-year intervals. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
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Table A5: Robustness Check: Saving Rate as the Dependent Variable No Correction for
Saving Rates above One
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Exchange Rate 0.114** 0.236*** 0.290*** 0.433*** 0.327*** 0.489*** 0.373** 0.583*** 0.472** 0.735**
[0.054] [0.085] [0.102] [0.144] [0.119] [0.163] [0.154] [0.212] [0.226] [0.290]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.007** -0.008 -0.010 -0.014 -0.018
[0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.012]
Log Home C. Price -0.115** -0.248*** -0.295*** -0.437*** -0.330*** -0.501*** -0.368** -0.594*** -0.470** -0.770***
[0.050] [0.087] [0.096] [0.147] [0.112] [0.164] [0.144] [0.206] [0.211] [0.278]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.007** 0.008 0.010 0.014 0.019*
[0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.011]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.036** -0.029 -0.025 -0.030 -0.031
[0.017] [0.025] [0.028] [0.033] [0.040]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2966 2966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Log PPP 0.115** 0.194** 0.299*** 0.407*** 0.332*** 0.465*** 0.363*** 0.565*** 0.469** 0.714**
[0.049] [0.081] [0.093] [0.154] [0.109] [0.171] [0.137] [0.216] [0.202] [0.296]
Log PPP * YTR -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.012 -0.015
[0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.011]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2966 2966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Dependent Variable: Saving Rate
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column
headings. PPP stands for purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. OLS fixed effects regressions are used. In addition to the key variables of interest, the
specifications include time dummies, additional source-country level covariates, and several individual-level covarites. Source-country level covariates other than the key variables of
interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. Individual-level covariates include log household income, log household size, employment of household
head, number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head -- in addition to
years since migration in 5-year intervals. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
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Table A6: Robustness Check - Savings Adjusted according to Minimum Consumption
Needs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Exchange Rate 0.841* 1.874** 1.732** 2.826** 2.146** 3.539*** 2.608** 5.233*** 2.757** 6.073***
[0.442] [0.736] [0.734] [1.174] [0.876] [1.344] [1.048] [1.644] [1.326] [1.959]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.055* -0.056 -0.086 -0.183** -0.219**
[0.030] [0.051] [0.059] [0.080] [0.093]
Log Home C. Price -0.793* -2.003*** -1.794** -2.813** -2.199*** -3.757*** -2.573** -5.504*** -2.684** -6.418***
[0.424] [0.755] [0.715] [1.204] [0.850] [1.368] [1.023] [1.655] [1.293] [1.959]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.060* 0.049 0.089 0.187** 0.228**
[0.031] [0.052] [0.059] [0.078] [0.091]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.526*** -0.179 -0.020 -0.058 0.006
[0.170] [0.226] [0.267] [0.308] [0.307]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2966 2966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Log PPP 0.754* 1.162 1.890*** 2.476** 2.269*** 3.517*** 2.522** 5.177*** 2.579** 6.159***
[0.425] [0.746] [0.721] [1.172] [0.851] [1.340] [1.031] [1.559] [1.300] [1.881]
Log PPP * YTR -0.019 -0.028 -0.064 -0.148** -0.194**
[0.029] [0.047] [0.054] [0.067] [0.081]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2966 2966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Dependent Variable: Log Savings
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
(Sample E)
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column
headings. PPP stands for purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. Honore Tobit Fixed Effects regressions are used. In addition to the key variables of interest,
the specifications include time dummies, additional source-country level covariates, and several individual-level covarites. Source-country level covariates other than the key variables
of interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. Individual-level covariates include log household income, log household size, employment of household
head, number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head -- in addition to
years since migration in 5-year intervals. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
(Sample A)
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
(Sample B)
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
(Sample C)
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
(Sample D)
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Table A7: Robustness Check Checking whether Missing Status of Dependent Variables
are Related to Key Variables of Interest
(1) (2) (3)
Missing Dummy
Savings
Missing Savings
Level
Missing Return
Intention
Log Exchange Rate 0.025 0.021 0.046
[0.025] [0.025] [0.104]
Log Home C. Price -0.015 -0.013 -0.026
[0.026] [0.024] [0.084]
Observations 13,043 13,043 13,043
No. of households 3,178 3,178 3,178
Log PPP 0.008 0.008 0.012
[0.030] [0.027] [0.073]
Observations 13,043 13,043 13,043
No. of households 3,178 3,178 3,178
A) Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-
2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age format while they are under the age of 65. PPP
stands for purchasing power parity. OLS fixed effects regressions are used. The control variables also include
year dummies as well as individual-level controls for dummies for years since migration in 5-year intervals with
reference to the household head. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. Statistical
significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
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Table A8: Tests of Propositions I and II by Return Intentions Tobit Random E¤ects
Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Exchange Rate 1.050** 2.152*** 2.716*** 3.955*** 3.076*** 3.808*** 3.435*** 5.046*** 3.083** 5.325***
[0.445] [0.567] [0.857] [1.071] [1.031] [1.243] [1.223] [1.415] [1.477] [1.676]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.058*** -0.069** -0.049 -0.116** -0.148***
[0.018] [0.035] [0.039] [0.046] [0.052]
Log Home C. Price -1.027** -2.243*** -2.737*** -3.999*** -3.046*** -4.045*** -3.378*** -5.317*** -3.034** -5.597***
[0.428] [0.557] [0.822] [1.034] [0.996] [1.201] [1.182] [1.366] [1.431] [1.621]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.062*** 0.068** 0.061 0.130*** 0.161***
[0.018] [0.033] [0.037] [0.043] [0.048]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.058*** -0.061* -0.048 -0.110*** -0.130***
[0.017] [0.032] [0.036] [0.042] [0.047]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2,966 2,966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Log PPP 1.009** 2.150*** 2.774*** 3.925*** 3.004*** 4.241*** 3.292*** 5.472*** 2.959** 5.575***
[0.423] [0.549] [0.798] [1.009] [0.978] [1.173] [1.159] [1.336] [1.405] [1.591]
Log PPP * YTR -0.056*** -0.059* -0.066* -0.130*** -0.154***
[0.017] [0.031] [0.035] [0.040] [0.044]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2,966 2,966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Dependent Variable: Log Savings
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
(Sample E)
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column
headings. PPP stands for purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. Tobit Random Effects regressions are used. In addition to the key variables of interest, the
specifications include time dummies, additional source-country level covariates, and several individual-level covarites. Source-country level covariates other than the key variables of
interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. The time-variant individual-level covariates include log household income, log household size, employment
of household head, number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head --
in addition to dummies for years since migration. The time-invariant individual-level covariates include country-of-origin dummies, age-at-arrival dummies, and a female dummy.
Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
(Sample A)
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
(Sample B)
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
(Sample C)
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
(Sample D)
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Table A9: Tests of Propositions I and II by Return Intentions Mundlak Approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Exchange Rate 1.054** 2.166*** 2.540*** 3.766*** 2.815*** 3.543*** 3.248*** 4.783*** 2.845* 4.921***
[0.445] [0.569] [0.856] [1.073] [1.030] [1.244] [1.219] [1.414] [1.470] [1.674]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.059*** -0.067* -0.047 -0.110** -0.137***
[0.018] [0.035] [0.039] [0.046] [0.052]
Log Home C. Price -1.031** -2.296*** -2.572*** -3.828*** -2.815*** -3.804*** -3.232*** -5.090*** -2.840** -5.239***
[0.427] [0.561] [0.821] [1.037] [0.994] [1.203] [1.178] [1.365] [1.425] [1.619]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.065*** 0.067** 0.058 0.123*** 0.150***
[0.018] [0.034] [0.037] [0.043] [0.048]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.062*** -0.063* -0.049 -0.106** -0.122***
[0.018] [0.033] [0.036] [0.042] [0.047]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2,966 2,966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Log PPP 1.013** 2.198*** 2.625*** 3.811*** 2.815*** 4.012*** 3.208*** 5.270*** 2.833** 5.273***
[0.423] [0.552] [0.796] [1.013] [0.975] [1.176] [1.154] [1.335] [1.397] [1.587]
Log PPP * YTR -0.058*** -0.060* -0.063* -0.123*** -0.143***
[0.017] [0.032] [0.035] [0.040] [0.044]
Observations 11,080 11,080 5,400 5,400 4,585 4,585 3,715 3,715 2,771 2,771
No. of households 2,966 2,966 998 998 924 924 826 826 717 717
Dependent Variable: Log Savings
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
(Sample E)
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column
headings. PPP stands for purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. Tobit random-effects estimation with a Mundlak approach is used. In addition to the key
variables of interest, the specifications include time dummies, additional source-country level covariates, and several individual-level covarites. Source-country level covariates other
than the key variables of interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. The time-variant individual-level covariates include log household income, log
household size, employment of household head, number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with
reference to the household head -- in addition to dummies for years since migration. The time-invariant individual-level covariates include country-of-origin dummies, age-at-arrival
dummies, and a female dummy. The independent variables whose group means are used include log household income, log household size, employment of household head, number of
employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head. Statistical significance *** at the
1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
(Sample A)
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
(Sample B)
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
(Sample C)
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
(Sample D)
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Table A10: Attrition Check I E¤ects of Key Variables of Interest on Panel Attrition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the
Log Exchange Rate -0.024* 0.019 0.023 -0.003 -0.012
[0.014] [0.023] [0.027] [0.032] [0.041]
Log Home C. Price 0.019 -0.027 -0.033 -0.010 -0.006
[0.015] [0.023] [0.027] [0.032] [0.041]
Observations 9,114 4,863 4,079 3,242 2,335
No. of households 1,500 656 582 484 376
Log PPP -0.014 0.040 0.048 0.033 0.040
[0.018] [0.026] [0.030] [0.036] [0.049]
Observations 9,114 4,863 4,079 3,242 2,335
No. of households 1,500 656 582 484 376
Dependent Variable: Attrition
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic
Panel in the person-age format while they are under the age of 65. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return
intentions; these restrictions are specified in column headings. PPP stands for purchasing power parity. OLS fixed effects regressions are used. The control
variables also include the logarithm of source country's GDP per capita, a control for political conflict in the source country, and year dummies as well as
individual-level controls for log household size, number of employed persons in the household, dummies for employed, married, spouse abroad, child abroad,
and German partner in addition to dummies for years since migration in 5-year intervals with reference to the household head. Standard errors are clustered at the
country of origin level. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
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Table A11: Attrition Check II Duration of Residence is 25 or Fewer Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log Exchange Rate 1.077** 1.912** 2.189** 2.559 2.873** 3.445* 2.896** 5.909*** 2.231 6.915**
[0.522] [0.947] [0.981] [1.761] [1.160] [1.883] [1.428] [2.268] [1.918] [3.049]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.042 -0.016 -0.032 -0.179* -0.238*
[0.035] [0.070] [0.070] [0.099] [0.126]
Log Home C. Price -1.010** -2.345** -2.288** -2.840 -2.858** -3.693* -2.743* -6.036*** -2.195 -7.132**
[0.507] [0.981] [0.978] [1.807] [1.141] [1.950] [1.418] [2.317] [1.922] [3.102]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.058 0.021 0.041 0.182* 0.238*
[0.037] [0.069] [0.070] [0.098] [0.123]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.774*** -0.255 0.263 0.338 0.528
[0.215] [0.308] [0.316] [0.363] [0.396]
Observations 8,196 8,196 3,069 3,069 2,543 2,543 2,044 2,044 1,602 1,602
No. of households 2695 2695 820 820 763 763 687 687 606 606
Log PPP 0.995* 0.562 2.311** 2.194 2.856** 3.448* 2.738* 5.520*** 2.195 5.410*
[0.509] [0.971] [0.977] [1.688] [1.141] [1.805] [1.428] [2.107] [1.925] [2.775]
Log PPP * YTR 0.018 0.005 -0.027 -0.141* -0.148
[0.035] [0.063] [0.064] [0.086] [0.104]
Observations 8,196 8,196 3,069 3,069 2,543 2,543 2,044 2,044 1,602 1,602
No. of households 2695 2695 820 820 763 763 687 687 606 606
Dependent Variable: Log Savings
Return Intention
more than 60
Percent of the Time
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age
format while they are under the age of 65 and their duration of residence is 25 or fewer years. The other four samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return
intentions; these restrictions are specified in column headings. PPP stands for purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. Honore Tobit Fixed Effects regressions
are used. In addition to the key variables of interest, the specifications include time dummies, additional source-country level covariates, and several individual-level covarites. Source-
country level covariates other than the key variables of interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. Individual-level covariates include log household
income, log household size, employment of household head, number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse
with reference to the household head -- in addition to years since migration in 5-year intervals. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10
percent level.
Full Sample
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
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Table A12: Attrition Check III Duration of Residence is 20 or Fewer Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Exchange Rate 0.775 2.587** 2.312* 4.750 3.410** 5.379* 2.551 6.490*
[0.615] [1.289] [1.302] [2.934] [1.507] [3.184] [2.089] [3.792]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.074* -0.092 -0.077 -0.176
[0.045] [0.104] [0.107] [0.147]
Log Home C. Price -0.505 -2.907** -2.271* -4.769 -2.989** -5.080 -2.089 -6.376
[0.607] [1.397] [1.314] [3.032] [1.465] [3.385] [2.025] [3.991]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.091* 0.092 0.078 0.180
[0.047] [0.104] [0.109] [0.150]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.949*** -0.886** -0.000 -0.106
[0.275] [0.441] [0.420] [0.460]
Observations 6,740 6,740 2,012 2,012 1,587 1,587 1,246 1,246
No. of households 2436 2436 663 663 620 620 565 565
Log PPP 0.507 0.367 2.311** 2.194 2.686* 6.165** 1.804 6.995*
[0.611] [1.203] [0.977] [1.688] [1.537] [3.031] [2.086] [3.663]
Log PPP * YTR 0.006 0.005 -0.124 -0.208
[0.040] [0.063] [0.096] [0.129]
Observations 6,740 6,740 3,069 3,069 1,587 1,587 1,246 1,246
No. of households 2436 2436 820 820 620 620 565 565
Dependent Variable: Log Savings
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German
Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age format while they are under the age of 65 and their duration of residence is 20 or fewer years. The other four
samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column headings. PPP stands for
purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. Honore Tobit Fixed Effects regressions are used. In addition to the key variables of
interest, the specifications include time dummies, additional source-country level covariates, and several individual-level covarites. Source-country level
covariates other than the key variables of interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a political conflict index. Individual-level covariates include
log household income, log household size, employment of household head, number of employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married,
spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the household head -- in addition to years since migration in 5-year intervals. Statistical
significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
Return Intention
more than 20
Percent of the Time
Return Intention
more than 40
Percent of the Time
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Table A13: Attrition Check IV Duration of Residence is 15 or Fewer Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Exchange Rate 0.409 2.351 1.854 9.449** 3.427* 11.404*
[0.715] [1.518] [1.264] [4.339] [2.070] [6.291]
Log Exchange Rate * YTR -0.077 -0.264* -0.264
[0.050] [0.147] [0.186]
Log Home C. Price 0.076 -2.360 -1.872 -9.722** -3.031 -12.152
[0.724] [1.745] [1.244] [4.891] [1.969] [7.547]
Log Home C. Price * YTR 0.089 0.264* 0.285
[0.054] [0.155] [0.210]
Log Host C. Price  * YTR -0.858*** -1.177* -0.893
[0.332] [0.636] [0.713]
Observations 5,163 5,163 1,316 1,316 1,003 1,003
No. of households 1913 1913 476 476 439 439
Log PPP 0.133 0.663 1.873 6.184 2.717 9.944**
[0.707] [1.312] [1.246] [4.119] [2.048] [4.857]
Log PPP * YTR -0.022 -0.146 -0.228
[0.041] [0.139] [0.141]
Observations 5,163 5,163 1,316 1,316 1,003 1,003
No. of households 1913 1913 476 476 439 439
Dependent Variable: Log Savings
A) Three Elements of PPP as Key Variables of Interest
B) PPP as Key Variable of Interest
Notes: The full sample includes all immigrant household heads (who arrived in Germany after age 18) in the 1992-2013 waves of the German
Socioeconomic Panel in the person-age format while they are under the age of 65 and their duration of residence is 15 or fewer years. The other
two samples make restrictions on the full sample based on immigrants' return intentions; these restrictions are specified in column headings.
PPP stands for purchasing power parity and YTR stands for years till retirement. Honore Tobit Fixed Effects regressions are used. In addition
to the key variables of interest, the specifications include time dummies, additional source-country level covariates, and several individual-
level covarites. Source-country level covariates other than the key variables of interest include the logarithm of GDP per capita and a political
conflict index. Individual-level covariates include log household income, log household size, employment of household head, number of
employed individuals in the household, and dummies for married, spouse abroad, child abroad, and German spouse with reference to the
household head -- in addition to years since migration in 5-year intervals. Statistical significance *** at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent
level, * at the 10 percent level.
Full Sample
Return Intention
at Least
for One Year
Return Intention more
than 20 Percent of the
Time
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